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FRENEMIES OF THE COURT: THE MANY FACES OF 
AMICUS CURIAE  
Helen A. Anderson * 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ask any lawyer what an ―amicus curiae‖ is, and you will be told 
that the term means ―friend of the court.‖
1
 The term has positive, 
even warm, connotations. Amicus briefs provide additional infor-
mation or perspectives to assist courts in deciding issues of public 
importance. Interest groups, law professors, and politically en-
gaged lawyers are happy to participate in important cases 
through such briefs. Amicus curiae participation is defended as 
democratic input into what is otherwise not a democratic branch 
of government.
2
 
Yet, amici curiae—nonparties who are nevertheless advocates, 
who are not bound by rules of standing and justiciability, or even 
rules of evidence, and who can present the court with new infor-
mation and arguments—occupy a unique place in the appellate 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. The author wishes to 
thank her colleagues at the University of Washington School of Law who attended a 
presentation of this article, and especially Thomas Cobb, Lisa Manheim, Kate O‘Neill, 
Kathy McGinnis, Zahr Said, and David Ziff for their excellent suggestions. Elizabeth Por-
ter read a draft and provided much expertise and encouragement. The author also wishes 
to thank the participants at the West Coast Rhetoric Workshop at the William S. Boyd 
School of Law (2012), and, in particular, Linda Edwards and Jeanne Moreno for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―amicus curiae‖ and also 
noting ―friend of the court‖ as an alternative term). 
 2. See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 315, 319–20 (2008); Ryan Salzman, Christopher J. Williams & Bryan T. Calvin, 
The Determinants of the Number of Amicus Briefs Filed Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
1953–2001, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 293, 294–95 (2011); Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends 
from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 190 
(2009). 
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courts.
3
 Amicus briefs have the potential to exert significant in-
fluence on a decision, despite their ―delusive innocuousness.‖
4
 
Amicus curiae participation has surged in recent years, primar-
ily by interest and advocacy groups wishing to advance their law 
reform efforts and to gain publicity.
5
 In addition, government 
agencies, officials, law professors, law clinics, individual lawyers, 
and even high school students have all added their arguments to 
those of the litigating parties.
6
 Yet the category of amicus curiae 
remains largely unexamined, and little attention is paid to the 
very different roles amici can play. In some ways, the very term 
amicus—friend—has obscured the full effect of these changes.
7
 
This article creates a taxonomy of amici curiae that allows for a 
clearer analysis of the advantages and potential drawbacks of 
amicus participation. Rather than categorizing amici curiae by 
the types of arguments made, as some scholars have done, this 
taxonomy categorizes amici by their relationships to the court 
and the parties.
8
 This article also looks beyond the Supreme 
 
 3. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal 
Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 675 
(2008). 
 4. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 
694, 694 (1963) (referencing ―delusive innocuous‖ in the context of the amicus brief‘s 
―seemingly static function and . . . offhand manner of . . . use in court‖). 
 5. See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus 
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 807, 810–11, 
825–26 (2004). 
 6. See Patricia Montemurri, Ann Arbor Teen’s Legal Brief: Juvenile Lifers Deserve a 
2nd Chance, DETROIT  FREE  PRESS  (Feb. 17, 2014, 11:11 AM), http://www.freep.com/articl 
e/20140217/NEWS06/302170018/Juvenile-Lifer-Catholic-Ann-Arbor-student-brief (describ-
ing a high school student‘s amicus brief to the Supreme Court of Michigan). See generally 
Tony Mauro, Bench Pressed, AM. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 85 (discussing the surge in amicus 
briefs in the Supreme Court of the United States). 
 7. Would courts be so welcoming to amicus curiae of every stripe if we called most of 
them, as the Canadians do, ―interveners?‖ Canadian courts use the term ―amicus curiae‖ 
to mean someone who has been asked by the court to provide a viewpoint which the court 
believes is necessary. See John Koch, Making Room: New Directions in Third Party Inter-
vention, 48 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 151, 157 & n.26 (1990). In Canada, the term ―inter-
vener‖ means someone who has asked to file a brief. See Rules of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, Rules 55–59, SOR/2002-156 (Can. 2014) (listing the requirements for intervening 
in Canada). Groups or persons seeking to intervene must show their interest in the litiga-
tion and that their submission will be ―useful and different‖ from the other submissions in 
the case. Edward Clark, The Needs of the Many and the Needs of the Few: A New System of 
Public Interest Intervention for New Zealand, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 71, 84 
(2005) (describing the Canadian system and arguing for a similar system in New Zealand). 
 8. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 2, at 203–09 (analyzing amicus curiae participation 
in terms of its function and role in argument rather than its relationship to the court); see 
also Nancy Bage Sorenson, Comment, The Ethical Implications of Amicus Briefs: A Pro-
posal for Reforming Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 30 ST. MARY‘S L.J.  
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Court of the United States—the focus of most scholarly writing on 
amicus curiae—and examines amicus practice in all appellate 
courts. 
When amici curiae are considered in light of their relationship 
to the court and the disputants, five major types emerge.
9
 These 
include lawyers appointed to argue a particular issue, groups or 
persons invited by the court to provide their perspective, those 
who advocate for one side of the dispute, those who support nei-
ther party, and those who just missed qualifying as intervenors 
yet have a stake in the outcome. These types can be called the 
―Court‘s Lawyer,‖ the ―Invited Friend,‖ the ―Friend of a Party,‖ 
the ―Independent Friend,‖ and the ―Near Intervenor.‖ Of these 
types, the Friend of a Party category of amicus curiae has grown 
most numerous in recent decades. In addition, federal, state, and 
local governments—especially the attorneys or solicitors gen-
eral—enjoy favored amicus status in appellate courts, even as 
they may participate in the ways outlined above.
10
 All of these 
roles do not sit comfortably together in one category. Yet, until 
now, the differences in amicus curiae participation have re-
mained largely unexamined. 
The failure to recognize the different roles has led to occasional 
frustration and incoherent analysis, primarily around the ques-
tion of ―interest.‖ A myth persists that amicus curiae should be 
disinterested; that its only duty should be to assist the court—as 
the name ―friend of the court‖ implies
11
—even though historically 
there was no such requirement.
12
 Yet of the types of amici out-
lined above, only the Court‘s Lawyer can be said not to have any 
interest of its own. On the one hand, courts recognize this reality; 
 
1219, 1245 (1999) (discussing the four basic functions of amicus briefs in Texas). 
 9. See infra Part II for a detailed discussion of each amicus curiae type. 
 10. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 210–14. 
 11. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt. (―[A]micus curiae should keep in mind the 
purpose of an amicus brief. As the name implies, an amicus curiae brief should assist the 
Court, not advocate a particular litigant‘s case.‖). See infra Part IV.A. 
 12. See e.g., Funbus Systems, Inc., v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm‘n, 801 F.2d 1120, 1125 
(9th Cir. 1986) (―Moreover, we have stated that there is no rule that amici must be totally 
disinterested.‖); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982) (―There is no rule, 
however, that amici be totally disinterested.‖); see also Krislov, supra note 4, at 703–04 
(discussing the function, not requirement, of amicus briefs in the early 20th century, and 
discussing the evolution of amicus curiae from neutrality to its contemporary role of parti-
sanship); Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the 
Party Begin After the Friends Leave? 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1254 (1992) (noting that 
when amicus curiae participation emerged on the federal level, it was not simply ―an im-
partial judicial servant‖). 
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on the other hand, they sometimes complain that amici curiae do 
not behave as true friends of the court. 
Again, the term amicus—friend—seems to obscure the reality 
of amicus curiae participation today. The real question is not 
whether amici should be interested, but what legitimate interests 
may justify amicus curiae participation. How that question is an-
swered depends in part upon the court‘s conception of its own 
role. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has helped the cause 
of amicus curiae considerably with its open door policy for amicus 
briefs. But beyond the Supreme Court, some lower federal courts 
and state appellate courts wrestle with the inherent contradic-
tions of amicus participation. Judge Richard Posner of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is a particularly 
prominent critic of amicus briefs. He has stated, ―The vast major-
ity of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and du-
plicate the arguments made in the litigants‘ briefs, in effect mere-
ly extending the length of the litigant‘s brief.‖
13
 And yet, despite 
occasional complaints, the role of amici curiae remains barely ex-
amined or restrained. In large part this may be because courts 
have no obligation toward amici: if an amicus brief is not helpful, 
the court can simply ignore it.
14
 
Much academic ink has been spilt on the study of amicus curi-
ae in the Supreme Court of the United States. Scholars have 
chronicled the dramatic rise in amicus participation in the 
Court,
15
 lauded this participation as democratic input that con-
tributes to the Court‘s legitimacy, and otherwise extolled the 
Court‘s welcoming attitude.
16
 Political scientists have also at-
tempted to measure the influence of this ―rising tide‖ of amicus 
briefs.
17
 Additionally, academics themselves are regular authors 
of amicus briefs.
18
 
 
 13. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 14. See Mauro, supra note 6, at 85 (discussing how Supreme Court Justices often skip 
over many filed amicus briefs). 
 15. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749 (2000); Krislov, supra note 4, at 
716. 
 16. See Garcia, supra note 2, at 319–20; Simmons, supra note 2, at 199–202. 
 17. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 749, 751–52, 789. 
 18. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338  
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More recently, critiques of amicus curiae participation have 
been heard, again focused on the Supreme Court.
 
Some criticize 
the sheer volume of amicus briefs, some question whether agen-
cies are using amicus briefs to evade rule-making procedures, and 
some question the Court‘s use of amicus curiae for factual re-
search or as a way around the adversarial process.
19
 
But the Supreme Court is unique. Parties are well-represented; 
even those without means will be represented by very competent 
volunteers eager for the experience and publicity. The Court gen-
erally addresses issues of wide applicability and welcomes the in-
put of certain amici curiae.
20
 
Other courts, however, may not be able to entertain as many 
friends as the Supreme Court. The federal courts of appeals are 
high-volume courts and may be more sensitive to an increase in 
their workload, or what might be perceived as meddling by inter-
est groups.
21
 State courts may have an additional concern: more 
than half of state high courts are sensitive to democratic pres-
sures through the election of judges.
22
 As a result, lobbying of 
 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (―Out of 22 amicus briefs, only two—filed by dueling 
groups of law professors—addressed the issue on the merits.‖). 
 19. See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Regulation by Amicus: The Department of 
Labor’s Policy Making in the Courts, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1223, 1223–31 (2013) (undertaking 
the investigation of amicus briefs as a means of evading rule-making procedures and its 
consequent effect on worker protection statutes); Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Su-
preme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 907, 909–11 (2011) (challenging the Court‘s alleged interference with the 
adversarial system through its discretion to appoint amicus curiae); Brianne J. Gorod, The 
Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–5, 7 (2011) 
(questioning amicus curiae participation as a means for obtaining off-the-record facts 
which were not tested under adversarial adjudication); Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble 
with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5–7), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2409071 (similarly challenging the introduction of off-the-record 
facts); Simard, supra note 3, at 700 (discussing Justice Ginsburg‘s belief that the sheer 
volume of briefs might cause the Court to miss a ―gem‖ fact or argument laid out in one 
brief). 
 20. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 761–62, 764. 
 21. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 19, at 35–36 (describing increased amicus curiae par-
ticipation and courts‘ tendencies to allow amicus briefs to influence their decision-making); 
John Harrington, Note, Amici Curiae in the Federal Courts of Appeals: How Friendly Are 
They?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 667, 677 (2005) (―The arguments against broad amicus 
participation raise concerns about workload problems, increased litigation costs, improper 
use of the device by parties, and the improper use of courts of appeals to further interest 
group politics.‖).  
 22. See, e.g., Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, ABA, http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2014) (reporting that fourteen states have elected high court justices, 
while another seventeen have uncontested retention elections). 
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state courts through amicus briefs has the potential to politicize 
state court proceedings in a way that is different than in federal 
courts with lifetime appointments. 
If amicus curiae participation grows in lower federal and state 
courts, these tribunals should clarify the role of amicus and con-
sider reasonable limitations. An open door policy can go too far. 
As one court stated in a different context, ―What makes for health 
as an occasional medicine would be disastrous as a daily diet.‖
23
 
The voices of the litigants, as well as basic adversarial principles, 
can get lost as more and more friends muscle their way into court, 
eager for influence or the limelight. Courts, especially state and 
lower federal courts, should exert some restrictions on amicus cu-
riae participation. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the history 
of amicus curiae in the American courts. Part II describes the dif-
ferent types of amici curiae, from governmental amici to the 
Court‘s Lawyer, Friends of a Party, Independent Friends, and 
Near Intervenors. Part III examines the minimal constraints on 
amicus curiae and the amicus brief itself—its content, page limit, 
and due date—as well as judicial attitudes towards amicus curi-
ae, as revealed in the court rules and occasional written opinions 
and surveys. Part IV considers whether and how to limit current 
amicus curiae participation. The article concludes that although 
amicus briefs do not seem to be a problem for most courts, there 
are some reforms to consider. To better assess amicus credibility, 
all courts should consider requiring financial and authorship dis-
closure, as the Supreme Court of the United States does. Should 
lower courts become overwhelmed with interest group briefs, they 
might also consider restrictions on duplicative briefs, or briefs 
that offer nothing useful for the court. A clearer sense of the dif-
ferent types of amicus curiae, and their different contributions or 
potential for abuse, will help courts address problems that may 
arise. This may also help some of those who complain that amici 
curiae are not true to the original concept of ―friend of the court.‖ 
In reality, we are long past that definition. 
 
 23. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing jury 
nullification). 
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I.  THE HISTORY OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Several articles recount the rise of amicus curiae participation 
in the Supreme Court of the United States.
24
 Most begin with a 
1963 article by Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From 
Friendship to Advocacy.
25
 Krislov‘s article, the thesis of which is 
clear from the title, describes the early, common law role of ami-
cus curiae as that of the disinterested bystander who offered the 
court important information or suggestions.
26
 ―Bystander‖ here is 
meant literally: a lawyer—though it need not have been a law-
yer—on another case who might have been in the court and then 
offered information or advice. The information might have been 
about a legal point, an error on the court‘s part, the death of a 
party, or the existence of other proceedings. Krislov tells of ―one 
extreme instance,‖ when ―Sir George Treby, a member of Parlia-
ment, informed the court that he had been present at the passage 
of the statute whose meaning was contested and, as amicus curi-
ae, wished to inform the court of the intent of Parliament in pass-
ing the legislation.‖
27
 At common law, the definition of amicus cu-
riae was flexible and rested within the court‘s discretion.
28
 
But even as amicus curiae were described as disinterested, the 
amicus role allowed courts to address the shortcomings of the ad-
versarial system by giving voice to other persons potentially af-
fected by the suit.
29
 An important function of the amicus curiae 
was to inform the court about collusive suits.
30
 Third parties who 
might not have standing, but whose interests were affected, could 
be heard. Thus, already in early times amicus curiae might not 
have been so much the court‘s friend, as the friend of a particular 
interest or person. 
It is worth pausing at this point to consider whether the term 
―amicus‖ or ―friend‖ may itself have undergone a change over the 
centuries. The principal modern definition of friend is ―a person 
 
 24. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme 
Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 782–84 (1990); Kearney & 
Merrill, supra note 15, at 749; Larsen, supra note 19, at 2. 
 25. Krislov, supra note 4. 
 26. See id. at 695. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 703–04. 
 30. Id. at 696. 
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whom one knows, likes, and trusts.‖
31
 In Samuel Johnson‘s 1755 
dictionary, the first entry for ―friend‖ is similar to today‘s mean-
ing: ―One joined to another in mutual benevolence and intimacy: 
opposed to foe or enemy.‖
32
 But Johnson mentioned other uses of 
the term: ―One without hostile intentions‖ and ―A familiar com-
pellation: Friend, how camest thou in hither?‖
33
 These more ex-
pansive meanings survive in the formal terms of address in Brit-
ish (and Canadian) courts and government, such as ―my learned 
friend.‖
34
 Thus, an amicus curiae probably did not mean one 
joined in intimacy and mutual benevolence with the court, but 
more likely meant something closer to ―not hostile‖ or ―respecta-
ble colleague.‖ Yet, the warm connotations of friendship linger 
with the term. 
In the early days of the United States, amicus curiae began to 
take on another role: that of representing the public—or govern-
mental—interest in private disputes.
35
 Krislov believed that ―[t]he 
creation of a complex federal system meant not only that state 
and national interests were potentially in conflict, but also that 
an even greater number of conflicting public interests were poten-
tially unrepresented in the course of private suits.‖
36
 The Su-
preme Court broadened the role of amicus curiae, so that the 
state and federal governments could be heard on matters that 
implicated their interests.
37
 The first appearance of an amicus cu-
riae for a state interest was that of Henry Clay on behalf of the 
 
 31. Friend, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 
2011), available at http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/hmdictenglang/friend/ 
0?searchId=add1f8be-4e40-11e4-8e03-0aea1e24c1ac&result=0 (using the search term 
―friend‖). Other definitions include: ―2. A person whom one knows; an acquaintance. 3. A 
person with whom one is allied in a struggle or cause; a comrade. 4. One who supports, 
sympathizes with, or patronizes a group, cause or movement: friends of the clean air 
movement.‖ Id. (emphasis added). The term is being somewhat watered down by the newer 
meaning of, ―any contact one has on a social networking site.‖ See id. 
 32. Friend (noun), A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF 
THE 1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON, http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?page_id=70 
70&i=861 (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Friend Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 
2010), https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/friend (―[M]y honourable 
friend Brit. Used to address or refer to another member of one‘s own party in the House of 
Commons. [M]y learned friend Brit. Used by a barrister or solicitor in court to address 
or refer to another barrister or solicitor. [M]y noble friend Brit. Used to address or refer 
to another member of one‘s own party in the House of Lords.‖). 
 35. Krislov, supra note 4, at 697. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 699–702. 
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State of Kentucky in an 1821 case involving land holdings.
38
 It 
quickly became an accepted practice for the federal and state gov-
ernments to appear as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court.
39
 
The appearance of private litigant amici curiae evolved more 
slowly.
40
 These private litigants might be parties with similar 
cases likely to be affected by the ruling, or persons who just bare-
ly lacked intervenor status.
41
 Initially, it was not the represented 
party but the lawyer himself who was considered the ―friend‖ of 
the court.
42
 But by the 1930s, it was quite common for the person 
or organization being represented to be denominated the amicus 
curiae.
43
 Over time, minority, labor, business, and advocacy 
groups began to participate in greater number as amici curiae in 
court.
44
 By the 1940s, some members of the Supreme Court were 
irritated at the rate of participation.
45
 Subsequently, the Court 
began to exercise its gatekeeping powers and the rate declined.
46
 
However, by the 1950s the policy changed, and amicus curiae 
participation began to increase again.
47
 In fact, amicus curiae 
played a critical role in the civil rights litigation of the 1950s and 
1960s.
48
 
In recent decades, amicus curiae participation in the Supreme 
Court has escalated, even as the Court has tightened the stand-
ing requirements for litigants.
49
 An empirical analysis showed 
that: 
From 1986 through 1995, amici filed briefs in 85% of the Court‘s ar-
gued cases. Between 1945 and 1995, the number of amicus brief fil-
 
 38. Id. at 700 (referencing Green v. Biddle, 22 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823)). 
 39. Id. at 701–02. 
 40. See id. at 702–03. 
 41. See id. at 703. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 710. 
 45. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24, at 784. 
 46. Krislov, supra note 4, at 713–14. 
 47. Id. at 714–16. 
 48. See id. at 718–20. 
 49. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24, at 784–85, 788; F. Andrew Hessick, Stand-
ing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 289 (2008) (―In its origi-
nal form, standing enforced the rule that the judiciary had the power only to vindicate pri-
vate rights in suits by private litigants. During the mid-twentieth century, however, the 
Court expanded standing by abandoning the private rights requirement and conditioning 
standing on a showing of factual injury. Then, during the last twenty-five years, the Court 
has again restricted standing.‖). 
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ings increased by more than 800%, while the numbers of cases de-
cided on the merits did not increase. Between 1996 and 2003, at 
least one amicus brief was filed in 95% of cases.
50
 
One ―prominent law firm partner‖ was quoted even thirty years 
ago as saying that ―[i]n today‘s world, effective representation of 
your client requires that you at least seriously explore the possi-
bility of enlisting persuasive amicus support on your client‘s be-
half.‖
51
 In 2013, the highly publicized Supreme Court case of 
United States v. Windsor
52
 attracted 134 appellate court briefs, 
according to Westlaw.
53
 During the same term, Shelby County v. 
Holder attracted 63 total appellate court briefs, almost all of 
which were amicus briefs,
54
 and the Affordable Care Act case, 
NFIB v. Sebelius, attracted over 140 amicus briefs.
55
 
Because the Court no longer screens amicus curiae in any 
meaningful way, it no longer creates law on the criteria for ami-
cus curiae. Perhaps for that reason, a 1903 Supreme Court deci-
sion, Northern Securities. Co. v. United States, is still cited.
56
 In 
that case, the Court denied an application to appear as amicus 
curiae and stated: 
Where in a pending case application to file briefs is made by counsel 
not employed therein, but interested in some other pending case in-
volving similar questions, and consent is given, the court has always 
exercised great liberality in permitting this to be done. And doubt-
less it is within our discretion to allow it in any case when justified 
by the circumstances. It does not appear that applicant is interested 
in any other case which will be affected by the decision of this case; 
 
 50. Simmons, supra note 2, at 193. 
 51. Andrew P. Moriss, Private Amici Curiae and the Supreme Court’s 1997–1998 Term 
Employment Law Jurisprudence, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 823, 825 (1999) (quoting 
Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 604 (1984)). 
 52. 570 U.S. ___, ___ , 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that DOMA is invalid be-
cause it is a violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
 53. Appellate Court Filings, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013), WESTLAW, https://a.next.westlaw.com/ (search ―133 S. Ct. 2675‖; then click on ―Fil-
ings‖; then narrow by ―Appellate Court Documents‖; and finally by ―Briefs‖). 
 54. Appellate Court Filings, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(2013), WESTLAW, https://a.next.westlaw.com/ (search ―133 S. Ct. 2612‖; then click on ―Fil-
ings‖; then narrow by ―Appellate Court Documents‖; and finally by ―Briefs‖). 
 55. Appellate Court Filings, NFIB v. Sebelius, 570 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 
WESTLAW, https://a.next.westlaw.com/ (search ―132 S. Ct. 2566‖; then click on ―Filings‖; 
then narrow by ―Appellate Court Documents‖; and finally by ―Briefs‖). 
 56. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555, 555–56 (1903); see, e.g., Ryan v. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing N. Sec. Co., 
191 U.S. at 556 (1903)); see also United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165 (6th Cir. 
1991) (citing N. Sec. Co., 191 U.S. 555 (1903)). 
2015] FRENEMIES OF THE COURT 371 
 
as the parties are represented by competent counsel, the need of as-
sistance cannot be assumed; and consent has not been given.
57
 
The Northern Securities decision expresses a much more lim-
ited view of the justification for amicus curiae than the Court now 
assumes. The case emphasizes the use of amicus curiae to make 
up for shortcomings in the representation of the parties or where 
amicus has an interest in a pending case with similar questions.
58
 
It says nothing about special perspective or information, the more 
common justifications for Friend of a Party briefs today.
59
 
Yet while the role of amicus curiae—and the rate of amicus 
participation—has expanded in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the federal courts of appeals have not experienced the 
same rate of increase.
60
 Although some federal judges complain 
about too many useless amicus briefs,
61
 one study of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit showed that 
amicus filings actually decreased between 2003 and 2007 and 
that the total number of such filings was not substantial.
62
 Anoth-
er study also suggests that amicus filings in all circuit level 
courts are low.
63
 Because these are high volume intermediate lev-
el courts, it makes sense that professional amicus curiae advocacy 
groups are less attuned to their dockets and less likely to know 
about upcoming cases unless approached by a party. 
The state experience has also been different from that of the 
Supreme Court. Even in the early part of the twentieth century, 
state courts were more likely to want amici curiae to be ―neutral‖ 
rather than aligned with one of the parties.
64
 In 1921, the Su-
 
 57. N. Sec. Co., 191 U.S. at 555–56 (internal citations omitted). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Sorenson, supra note 8, at 1220.  
 60. See Simard, supra note 3, at 686; see also Sylvia H. Walbolt & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., 
Amicus Briefs: Friend or Foe in Florida Courts?, 32 STETSON L. REV. 269, 281–82 (2003) 
(highlighting, in particular, the rise of amicus participation in the Supreme Court of the 
United States). 
 61. Paul M. Collins Jr., & Wendy L. Martinek, Who Participates as Amici Curiae in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals? 94 JUDICATURE 128, 130 (2010).  
 62. See P. Stephen Gidiere III, The Facts and Fictions of Amicus Curiae Practice in 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 11–12 (2008). 
 63. See Simard, supra note 3, at 686–87. Though still low, there were slightly higher 
percentages of cases with amicus (15% or more) in the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. 
See id. at 686–87 & n.75. 
 64. Sarah F. Corbally, Donald C. Bross & Victor E. Flango, Filing of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs in State Courts of Last Resort: 1960–2000, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 39, 43 (2004) (citing Peo-
ple v. Gibbs, 38 N.W. 257 (Mich. 1888)). Although the Gibbs court found no error in the 
attorney—formerly working with the prosecution—suggesting that the defendant be re- 
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preme Court of Michigan distinguished between amicus curiae 
and intervenors, stating that the former were welcome in cases of 
public import.
65
 However, the court denied either status to a citi-
zen who sought to participate in a suit between a city and a pow-
er company, because he was too interested to be an amicus curiae 
and not interested enough to be an intervenor.
66
 
In 1927, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in In re Stolen, re-
buked sixty lawyers who filed an amicus brief in a judicial disci-
pline case. Calling the brief a ―petition,‖ that court stated: 
The brief itself did not pretend to examine or analyze the evidence, 
and, so far as a discussion of the law was concerned, it did no more 
than to cite a few cases upon the most fundamental propositions. If 
this was done deliberately and with the purpose of influencing the 
court, it was reprehensible. If done thoughtlessly and without any 
consideration, the opinions of these members of the bar are entitled 
to no weight . . . . If 60 members of the bar may thus petition the 
court with reference to matters pending before it, then 60 plumbers 
cannot be denied the same privilege.
67
 
The In re Stolen court seemed to object to a frank effort to lobby 
the court without even a fig leaf of legal argument.
68
 But it is not 
clear that the court would have welcomed the brief even with le-
gal argument. Wisconsin‘s present day rules for amicus curiae 
participation, however, are flexible.
69
 
Although the rate of amicus curiae participation in state courts 
is nowhere near that of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
it has grown, albeit unevenly. A 2004 article showed great varia-
tion in the rate of amicus curiae participation in the states.
70
 It 
found higher amicus curiae participation in Alabama, California, 
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, and Washington.
71
 But the authors noted that 
 
quired to plead guilty or not guilty to the charges, its reasoning was that any member of 
the bar could have made the suggestion. Gibbs, 38 N.W. at 258. 
 65. City of Grand Rapids v. Consumers‘ Power Co., 185 N.W. 852, 854 (Mich. 1921). 
 66. Id. at 853–54; Krislov, supra note 4, at 704 & n.57. 
 67. In re Stolen, 214 N.W. 379, 387 (Wis. 1927) (citation omitted). 
 68. See id.; see also Garcia, supra note 2, at 336–38 (vigorously defending amicus par-
ticipation as expressive activity protected by the First Amendment‘s Petition Clause). 
 69. WIS. STAT. § 809.19(7)(a) (2012) (―A person not a party may by motion request 
permission to file a brief. The motion shall identify the interest of the person and state 
why a brief filed by that person is desirable.‖). 
 70. See Corbally, Bross & Flango, supra note 64, at 44–46. 
 71. See id. at 46. 
2015] FRENEMIES OF THE COURT 373 
 
other studies had grouped the states slightly differently.
72
 The 
2004 study also tentatively concluded that the states with the 
most restrictive rules created the restrictions in response to high 
amicus curiae participation
73
 and that courts granted 70% of mo-
tions to file amicus briefs.
74
 It was also rare for the courts to solic-
it amici curiae. Although the number of amicus briefs in state 
high courts tripled in the 1980s,
75
 less than 5% of the high court 
decisions in Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, South Dakota, and Texas in-
volved amicus curiae briefs.
76
 
A survey of amici curiae in California showed a very high rate 
of participation. In the California Supreme Court, 1,868 amicus 
briefs were filed in 422 of the 707 civil cases decided between 
2000 and 2009.
77
  
My own research shows variation consistent with these studies. 
In 2010, for example, the Washington Supreme Court issued 49 
out of 141 reported opinions in which at least one amicus brief 
was filed (35%), while the California Supreme Court issued 54 out 
of 102 such opinions (53%). Arizona had 9 supreme court deci-
sions in which amicus briefs were filed, out of a total of 41 report-
ed opinions that year (22%).78   
Scholarly interest in amicus curiae has been intermittent over 
the last twenty-five years. Some scholars have attempted to em-
pirically measure the effect of amicus briefs on case outcomes—a 
difficult task.79 Scholars have also looked at interest group partic-
 
 72. See id. at 45 (citing Paul Brace & Kellie Sims Butler, New Perspectives for the 
Comparative Study of the Judiciary: The State Supreme Court Project, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 
243, 253 (2001) (finding high amicus curiae participation in California, Michigan, New 
Jersey, Oklahoma, and Oregon)). 
 73. Corbally, Brass & Flango, supra note 64, at 50. The authors rejected their hypoth-
esis that more restrictive rules would mean fewer amicus briefs filed, concluding instead 
that restrictive rules were a reaction to larger numbers of amicus curiae filings. Id. at 53. 
 74. Id. at 53. 
 75. Id. at 44. 
 76. Brace & Butler, supra note 72, at 252–53. 
 77. M.C. Sungaila, Effective Advocacy Through Amicus Briefs, S.F. DAILY J., June 28, 
2010, at 6. 
 78. These figures come from a Westlaw Next search of California, Washington, and 
Arizona Supreme Court opinions. To get these figures for each state, I first went to ―state 
materials,‖ then clicked on the individual state, and then clicked on ―supreme court‖ to 
restrict the search to the highest court. I then searched the supreme court opinions as fol-
lows: ―adv: DA(=2010) & DI,SY(court)‖ for the total number of supreme court opinions, 
then searched within results for ―at(amic!)‖ for the number of cases with at least one ami-
cus brief. 
 79. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 5, at 810–16; Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C. Corley &  
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ipation through a political science lens.80 While some have exam-
ined the types of arguments and information provided by amici 
curiae, they have not addressed the very different roles subsumed 
within the categories of amicus curiae, nor have they addressed 
the tension between the ideal of the impartial friend and the real-
ity of the interested lobbyist. 
II.  THE TYPES OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Some scholars have examined the type of information or argu-
ments presented by amicus curiae,
81
 but there has been no overall 
examination of the different types of amicus curiae and their dif-
ferent roles. Neither courts nor scholars have focused on the dif-
ference between the Court‘s Lawyer (an attorney asked to make a 
particular argument), the Invited Friend (one invited by the court 
to appear as amicus curiae), the Friend of a Party, the Independ-
ent Friend (amicus curiae not aligned with a party), and the Near 
Intervenor. Understanding the different roles is important as 
they call for different criteria and policy considerations. 
The types of organizations and individuals who will participate 
as amici curiae also vary, ranging from activist or public advocacy 
groups, nonprofits, corporations, business alliances, and political 
organizations, to individuals (including law professors) concerned 
about the issue or the outcome of the case.
82
 One particular type 
of organization receives special treatment and is in a category by 
itself: the government. 
A.  Governmental Amici 
The executive branch enjoys special status in both federal and 
state courts. Most courts allow the federal or state attorney gen-
eral or solicitor general to file amicus briefs without advance 
 
Jesse Hamner, Me Too? An Investigation of Repetition in U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Cu-
riae Briefs, 97 JUDICATURE 228, 230 (2014); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 751–56. 
 80. See LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT, at xi–xii (1985); Caldeira & Wright, 
supra note 24, at 783; Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Interest Group Success in 
the Courts: Amicus Participation in the Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339, 339–40 
(1993). 
 81. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 2, at 203–09 (examining the functions of amicus 
curiae briefs); Sorenson, supra note 8, at 1220–21 (discussing the basic functions of amicus 
curiae briefs). 
 82. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24, at 790–91 (listing different classifications of 
amici curiae). 
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permission, even where leave of the court is otherwise required 
for amicus curiae.
83
 It is understood that many private disputes 
can have public importance and may affect the government or the 
enforcement of the laws. 
While the attorney general or solicitor general is the usual 
court representative of a government‘s position, occasionally the 
corresponding chief executive might file an amicus brief on its 
own behalf. For example, in the recent litigation over the Afford-
able Care Act,
84
 Governor Christine Gregoire of Washington 
joined several attorneys general of other states in an amicus brief 
in support of the legislation,
85
 while Washington‘s attorney gen-
eral joined in a brief against the law.
86
 State legislators and mem-
bers of Congress also filed amicus briefs in the litigation,
87
 alt-
hough in doing so, they did not represent the government as a 
whole.
88
 
 
 83. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29(a) (―The United States or its officer or agency or a 
state may file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the parties or leave of court. 
Any other amicus curiae may file a brief only by leave of court or if the brief states that all 
parties have consented to its filing.‖); accord ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16(a) (―[L]eave or written 
consent shall not be required when the brief is presented by the State of Arizona or an of-
ficer or agency thereof, or by a county, city, or town.‖); CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f)(8) (―The Attor-
ney General may file an amicus curiae brief without the Chief Justice‘s permission unless 
the brief is submitted on behalf of another state officer or agency.‖). 
 84. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012); Florida 
v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 85. See Brief of the States of Oregon, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 1, Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(No. 11-400). Governor Gregoire also filed her own brief at the court of appeals level. See 
Amicus Brief of the Governor of Washington Christine Gregoire in Support of Defend-
ants/Appellants, Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067). 
 86. Reply Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant States, Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & 
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067). 
 87. E.g., Brief of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 1–2, Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. ___, 132 
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400). 
 88. See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2003). 
Judge Posner has opined that legislators cannot represent the government in an amicus 
brief. 
There is something to be said for asking the state to speak in litigation with 
one voice. Insofar as the district court in the decision that has been appealed 
placed limitations on what a state legislature may do, not only in this case 
but presumably in any like case that should arise in the future, it might seem 
that the leaders of the legislature have a direct interest in other cases, one of 
the situations in which amicus participation is appropriate. But that argu-
ment would imply that any state legislator should have a right to file an ami-
cus curiae brief when the constitutionality of state legislation is challenged—
an extreme position that could invite a blizzard of briefs.  
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Government agencies can also participate as amici curiae. For 
example, one scholar has examined the Department of Labor‘s ef-
forts to influence the interpretation of wage and hour legislation 
through amicus curiae activity.
89
 The relatively new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau has a visible amicus curiae pres-
ence.
90
 
Although government officials—particularly the solicitors gen-
eral or attorneys general—have a special amicus curiae status 
and role in many cases, they may also participate in most of the 
roles described below, although most likely not as the Court‘s 
Lawyer. 
B.  The Court’s Lawyer 
The Court‘s Lawyer is the court‘s hand-picked advocate who is 
asked to represent a particular position.
91
 The Supreme Court of 
the United States makes use of these appointed amici curiae to 
argue positions abandoned (or never advocated) by a party or to 
defend lower court reasoning neither party endorses.
92
 This latter 
type of amicus curiae is perhaps the most ―friendly‖ to the court. 
But this friend is more of an advocate retained for the court—
highly partisan rather than disinterested. 
 
Id. 
 89. See Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1226–28 (arguing that aggressive amicus activity 
and exploration of Chevron deference allows the department to avoid the rule-making pro-
cess); see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 
2156, 2166–67 (2012) (holding Chevron deference would not apply to amicus position 
where such deference would create ―unfair surprise‖ or where the agency‘s position ―does 
not reflect the agency‘s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question‖) (quoting 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). 
 90. Amicus Program, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance. 
gov/amicus/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
 91. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 916 (demonstrating the Supreme Court‘s willing-
ness to propose ―a friend of the court [] be appointed‖ to argue if counsel for respondent is 
unwilling). 
 92. See id. at 918. An example of this kind of amicus curiae is Professor Paul Cassel, 
invited to make the argument to overrule Miranda v. Arizona in Dickerson v. United 
States. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 441 & n.7 (2000); see also Brief for Court-Appointed 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability at 1–2, NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 and 11-400) [hereinafter Brief for Court-Appointed 
Amicus Curiae] (―This brief is submitted in response to the Court‘s order of November 18, 
2011, appointing counsel to brief and argue in support of the judgment of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that the minimum care provision of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, is severable from the en-
tirety of the remainder of the Act.‖). 
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With this type, the term amicus curiae refers to the lawyer ap-
pointed to represent a position, not to a group or person repre-
sented by the lawyer. For all other types of amici curiae, the term 
usually refers to the client, often an interest group, rather than 
the lawyer who files the brief.
93
 The Court‘s Lawyer seems close to 
one historical understanding of the term, reflected in the criteria 
for amicus applications in many jurisdictions. Some court rules 
suggest that an amicus curiae may be appropriate where one par-
ty is without counsel or poorly represented.
94
 Thus, in the past, 
where the court believed one party needed additional representa-
tion, or that a particular argument needed development, it might 
have asked a lawyer to act as amicus curiae.
95
 However, today‘s 
Court‘s Lawyers may be appointed regardless of the adequacy of 
party representation in proceedings below.
96
 
The Court‘s Lawyer type of amicus curiae seems problematic in 
that the court appears to be stepping out of its neutral arbiter 
role and promoting advocacy of particular positions, even where 
both parties are well-represented. On the other hand, these ap-
pointments can be seen as an effort by the court to fully air ar-
guments it is considering but which the parties are not making. 
Once again, the Affordable Care Act litigation provides examples 
of this type of amicus curiae.
97
 Interestingly, in that case, addi-
tional amicus briefs were filed in support of the court-appointed 
amici curiae; even the amici have amici!
98
 
 
 93. See Mark Walsh, Frequent Fliers: It Was Another Big Term for Amicus Curiae 
Briefs at the High Court, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2013, at 16 (describing an increasing number of 
amicus briefs due to interest groups viewing them as strategy). Of course, sometimes the 
client and lawyer are one and the same. Individual lawyers now also file briefs on their 
own behalf as Friends of a Party. See id. at 17, 67 (noting the impact of a brief filed by 
former Solicitor General Walter Dellinger on his own behalf). 
 94. See infra notes 213–16 and accompanying text. 
 95. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555, 555–56 (1903) (suggesting that 
amicus could be appointed where one party was not competently represented). 
 96. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 916, 920, 92425, 93132 (noting that the Court 
may appoint ―friends of the court‖ where the Respondent has since changed its position, 
where neither party accepts the lower court‘s sua sponte decision, or where the Court rais-
es its own question sua sponte).  
 97. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae, supra note 92, at 1–2; Brief for Court-
Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur (Anti-Injunction Act) at 1, U.S. Dep‘t of 
Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
 98. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, SCOTUSBLOG, http: 
//www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-federation-of-independent-business-v-sebel 
ius/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) (listing ―Amicus Briefs in Support of the Court-Appointed 
Amicus‖). 
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C.  The Invited Friend
99
 
The Invited Friend is the individual, group, or institutional ac-
tor asked to provide its perspective. For example, the court might 
ask a government agency, another branch of the court system, or 
the attorney general to weigh in on issues of public import or is-
sues that may affect that institution.
100
 Unlike the Court‘s Law-
yer, the Invited Friend is not assigned a particular position or ar-
gument but rather assists on a more generalized level.
101
 This 
type of amicus curiae is the prototype of the impartial friend, 
providing helpful advice or information. 
D.  Friend of a Party 
The Friend of a Party amicus curiae usually coordinates with a 
party and may be solicited by a party.
102
 Some of these friends are 
actually ―puppets‖ of the party:
103
 the party may have created or 
funded the amicus curiae organization, or the party‘s lawyer may 
have actually authored the brief.
104
 Not all states even require 
disclosure of such a connection and few forbid it outright.
105
 
 
 99. In Canada and other Commonwealth countries, only those invited by the Court to 
submit briefs are properly called amicus curiae. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
Others who seek to file briefs in cases in which they are not a party are called ―interven-
ers.‖ See supra note 7. 
 100. See, e.g., Entente Design, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 219 n.2 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2013) (―Although we recognize the superior court ordinarily lacks standing to op-
pose a petition such as this, we invited a response from the superior court because of the 
potential impact of our decision on the superior court‘s civil case management proce-
dures.‖) (internal citations omitted) (holding that assignment of action to new judge was 
not within the master calendar rule‘s limitation on peremptory challenges to judges). 
 101. See David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme 
Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of 
the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 242 (2009) (referencing the Supreme 
Court‘s use of the solicitor general as an invited friend to assist in analyzing the position); 
Neal Nettesheim & Clare Ryan, Friend of the Court Briefs: What the Curiae Wants in an 
Amicus, 80 WIS. LAW. 10, 12 (2007) (noting how the court may solicit amicus participation 
where the parties have inadequately briefed an important issue).  
 102. See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003); Nat‘l 
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 103. See Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 544; Scheidler, 223 F.3d at 617. 
 104. See Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 2003); Scheidler, 223 F.3d at 
617. 
 105. Glassroth, 347 F.3d at 919 (―It comes as no surprise to us that attorneys for par-
ties solicit amicus briefs in support of their position, nor are we shocked that counsel for a 
party would have a hand in writing an amicus brief. In fact, we suspect that amicus briefs 
are often used as a means of evading the page limitations on a party‘s briefs.‖) (internal 
citations omitted). The puppet amicus curiae can also risk making arguments that the  
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But even where there is no direct financial connection, party 
kinship may be clear, such as industry groups appearing on be-
half of an industry party, unions supporting the position of an 
employee, or advocacy groups arguing for a position that benefits 
a minority group of which a party is a member. Although the 
Friend of a Party amicus curiae is very common today, especially 
in the Supreme Court, some courts remain suspicious of amici cu-
riae with close connections to a party.
106
 
It is the Friend of a Party category of amicus curiae whose par-
ticipation has grown the most over the last century, especially in 
recent decades.
107
 This is the prototypical amicus curiae that now 
springs to mind when we hear the term. We think of an interest 
or advocacy group, induced to participate because the issue is im-
portant to its membership. Friend of a Party amici curiae may al-
so hope that amicus participation will serve their efforts to gain 
visibility. Amicus briefs become another means of lobbying on be-
half of the membership.
108
 
Friend of a Party briefs can also be a part of a coordinated law 
reform effort. For example, the United States Chamber of Com-
merce has enjoyed success with its efforts in the Supreme Court 
 
party dare not. See Dan Schweitzer, Fundamentals of Preparing a United States Supreme 
Court Amicus Brief, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 523, 532 (2003). 
 106. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 
1997); Liberty Lincoln Mercury Inc., v. Ford Marketing Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 82 (D.N.J. 
1993) (―When the party seeking to appear as amicus curiae is perceived to be an interested 
party or to be an advocate of one of the parties to the litigation, leave to appear amicus 
curiae should be denied . . . [But] [w]here a petitioner‘s attitude toward a litigation is pa-
tently partisan, he should not be allowed to appear as amicus curiae.‖) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted); see also Andrew Frey, Amici Curiae: Friends of the Court or 
Nuisances?, 33 LITIG. 5, 5 (2006) (referencing the recent ―movement of marked antipathy 
to amicus briefs‖ generally, including Judge Posner‘s hostility). 
 107. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
 108. Advocacy group websites often tout amicus brief filings. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae 
Briefs, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/amicus.html (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2014) (listing some recent amicus briefs filed by the ABA in various cases); The 
Internet Association Files Amicus Brief to Quash the NYAG Subpoena Against Airbnb, 
INTERNET ASS‘N (Nov. 18, 2013), http://internetassociation.org/11082013airbnbamicus 
brief/ (publishing news of the Internet Association‘s filing of an amicus brief in a press re-
lease); Amicus Briefs, NAT‘L ASS‘N OF CRIM. DEF. L., http://www.nacdl.org/Amicus/ (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2014) (providing links to the NACDL‘s Amicus Curiae Committee Mission 
Statement and former amicus briefs catalogued by year); EPIC Amicus Curiae Briefs, 
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/amicus/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) (―EPIC fre-
quently files amicus curiae, or ‗friend of the court‘, briefs in federal and state appellate 
cases concerning emerging privacy and civil liberties issues.‖). Even government agencies 
boast of their amicus activity. Accord Amicus Program, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/amicus/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
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and is now increasingly filing amicus briefs in state courts.
109
 The 
International Association of Defense Counsel also boasts of its 
amicus curiae record in federal and state court.
110
 
E.  Independent Friend 
The Independent Friend amicus curiae is an organization or 
individual who does not support either party.
111
 They may partici-
pate for the same reasons that groups decide to weigh in as 
Friends of a Party: because the issue is important to them and/or 
their membership. Although most amici curiae will pick sides in 
the dispute, it is not necessary that they do so.
112
 The Independent 
Friend seems to be relatively rare, however. After the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in the case of Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, 
for example, only two amicus briefs were filed on behalf of neither 
party out of eighty-four total.
113
 
F.  Near Intervenors 
Near Intervenors are people or groups likely to be affected by a 
case but whose interest is not sufficient for intervention.
114
 Not all 
courts allow amicus curiae with this type of interest, on the 
 
 109. Holly Yeager, U.S. Chamber, Other Business Groups Set Sights on State Courts, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2013, at A5. 
 110. See Mary-Christine Sungaila, The IADC Amicus Brief Program: Its Increasing 
Success and Influence, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 32, 34 (2014). 
 111. See Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International and National Law, 
INT‘L L. 415, 428 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 1st ed. 2005). 
 112. Yet too much independence can also thwart amicus curiae status. For example, an 
amicus curiae application by an organization that supported neither party‘s position—
where the parties were not opposed—was held properly excluded. State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 
654, 656, 674 (Conn. 2005) (ruling that where the defendant did not contest the death 
penalty, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the public defender organization amicus 
curiae, intervenor, or next friend status). In another example, attorneys for a district court 
judge sought to appear as amicus curiae in a case which had been reassigned to another 
judge, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that neither the judge nor her attor-
neys had sufficient interest to appear as amicus curiae. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 
F.3d 166, 169–71 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 113. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 732 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). See the list of amici curiae in the case including the two filed on be-
half of neither party at Amicus History: Hobby Lobby Supreme Court Amicus Briefs Among 
Record Levels, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hobby 
lobbyamicus/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
 114. Rios v. Enterprise Ass‘n Steamfitters Local Union No. 638, 520 F.2d 352, 357 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (denying applicants intervention because of a lack of sufficient interest in the 
case). 
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grounds that an amicus curiae should be an impartial advisor to 
the judiciary.
115
 But many courts will use this amicus curiae cate-
gory as a remedy for those who cannot make a showing for inter-
vention. For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted 
that a crime victim, even if lacking standing in the defendant‘s 
appeal, could participate as an amicus curiae.
116
 In another exam-
ple, an Indian tribe was denied permission to intervene in a dis-
pute between two casino developers, but was allowed to file an 
amicus brief ―because of its involvement in the events leading to 
this case and its interest in the Transactions Agreements at is-
sue.‖
117
 Additionally, a local irrigation district was permitted to 
file an amicus brief in a Clean Water Act case against dairy oper-
ations.
118
 There are other examples.
119
 This Near Intervenor type 
of amicus curiae will be anything but impartial. Such amici are 
advocates of their own private interests.
120
 Some court rules 
acknowledge this possibility and ask amici curiae to disclose 
whether their interest in the case is private or public.
121
 
 
 115. Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 418, 420 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (―Indeed, if the proffer comes 
from an individual with a partisan, rather than impartial view, the motion for leave to file 
an amicus brief is to be denied, in keeping with the principle that an amicus must be a 
friend of the court and not a friend of a party to the cause.‖). But see Neonatology Assocs. 
v. Comm‘r, 293 F.3d 128, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing generally the difficult conflict 
between impartiality and interest, but noting that an amicus curiae is implicitly required 
to have an interest in the case). 
 116. State v. Tedesco, 69 A.3d 103, 109 (N.J. 2013) (―The victim‘s arguments should be 
heard and evaluated, if not as a party with standing, then as an amicus under Rule 1:13-
9.‖). 
 117. NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1063, 
1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
 118. Cmty. Ass‘n for Restoration of the Env‘t (CARE) v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, 54 F. 
Supp. 2d 974, 975–76 (E.D. Wash. 1999). 
 119. In a dispute between the United States government and a firm constructing cais-
sons on coral reefs, a federal district court denied the right to intervene to one who 
claimed to own the reef, but allowed the would-be intervenor to proceed as an amicus curi-
ae. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 820–22, 829 (5th Cir. 1967) (revers-
ing the district court decision and allowing the party to intervene); see also Silver v. Bab-
bitt, 166 F.R.D. 418, 434–35 (D. Ariz. 1994) aff’d, 68 F.3d 480, 481 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying 
motion to intervene but granting amicus curiae status). 
 120. See, e.g., NGV Gaming, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (―[A]micus with partisan interests 
are now quite common.‖). 
 121. See, e.g., MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 129.01 (requiring that an amicus request must 
―identify whether the applicant‘s interest is public or private in nature‖); N.J. GEN. R. 
1:13-9(a) (requiring that amicus must state ―the nature of the public interest therein and 
the nature of the applicant‘s special interest, involvement or expertise in respect thereof‖); 
OR. R. APP. P. 8:15 (―The application shall state whether the applicant intends to present a 
private interest of its own or to present a position as to the correct rule of law that does 
not affect a private interest of its own.‖). 
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The Near Intervenor should be distinguished from the amicus cu-
riae who is interested in the outcome because it has a similar case 
pending, one that could be controlled by precedent set in the in-
stant case. The latter type of amicus will probably fall into the 
Friend of a Party category (e.g., an employer involved in another 
lawsuit that will be controlled by the precedent). If the precedent 
is likely to be of wide applicability—as is usually true in the Su-
preme Court—then an interest group (e.g., an employer associa-
tion) will probably weigh in. In contrast, the Near Intervenor has 
an interest in the particular dispute at issue, not just its likely 
precedential value. 
The Near Intervenor may wish for more involvement in the 
case than amicus curiae status allows. An experiment with ―liti-
gating amicus curiae‖
122
 illustrates what can happen when the 
categories are blended. 
Decried as a ―legal mutant‖ by the Sixth Circuit,
123
 this type of 
amicus curiae appears to have been a hybrid status used by trial 
courts for a time in the 1980s and 1990s.
124
 The hybrid had an in-
tervenor‘s ability to file pleadings and present evidence, but did 
not need to satisfy the more demanding requirements of interve-
nor status.
125
 Instead, courts used the flexible definition of an 
amicus curiae. Often, it was the U.S. Attorney who received this 
status.
126
 After the Sixth Circuit‘s denunciation of the practice, 
there have been few references to ―litigating amicus curiae‖ in the 
case law. The term seems to have died away.
127
 Like most hybrids, 
 
 122. See generally Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus: When Does the Party 
Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1992) (discussing the devel-
opment of the ―litigating amicus curiae,‖ a type of amicus which possesses the capability to 
participate in a case beyond mere brief writing). 
 123. United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 164 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 124. See Wyatt v. Hanan, 868 F. Supp. 1356, 1359 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (―The court believes 
that the concept of amicus curiae is flexible and that, as long as the amicus does not in-
trude on the rights of the parties, it can have a range of roles: from a passive one of provid-
ing information to a more active participatory one. In other words, although amici should 
not assume control of the litigation, they can take an active role in some cases beyond 
providing information.‖); DeVonish v. Garza, 510 F. Supp. 658, 658–59 (W.D. Tex. 1981) 
(noting that the court appointed the federal government to participate as litigating amicus 
curiae in litigation over conditions at the county jail). 
 125. See EEOC v. Boeing Co., 109 F.R.D. 6, 11 (W.D. Wash. 1985). 
 126. Krislov, supra note 4, at 705. Krislov recounts instances during the desegregation 
era when the federal district courts of Arkansas and Mississippi designated the United 
States Attorney as amicus curiae with authority to file pleadings, submit evidence, and 
initiate further proceedings in order to maintain and preserve the due administration of 
justice. Id. at 718–20. 
 127. See, e.g., NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d  
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it has been unable to reproduce. The story of the ―litigating ami-
cus curiae‖ shows the limits of the flexibility of the amicus curiae 
role. 
The Sixth Circuit‘s United States v. Michigan decision involved 
a suit by the federal government against the State of Michigan 
over prison conditions.
128
 The would-be intervenors were a group 
of prisoners who eventually were represented by the American 
Civil Liberties Union (―ACLU‖) and a prisoners‘ rights group.
129
 
When the trial court denied them permission to intervene as real 
parties in interest, it allowed the prisoners to continue as amicus 
curiae, and then allowed them as ―litigating amicus curiae‖ to file 
pleadings.
130
 The reviewing court found that as amicus curiae, the 
prisoners had hijacked the case:   
There can be little doubt from the record of this appeal that the Knop 
class, in its role of ―litigating amicus curiae‖ and exercising the au-
thority of a named party/real party in interest, has virtually as-
sumed effective control of the proceedings in derogation of the origi-
nal parties to this controversy. The creation of this legal mutant 
characterized as ―litigating amicus curiae,‖ as demonstrated by the 
cascading acrimony among the participants to this litigation, if ac-
corded precedential viability, will implicate and erode the future core 
stability of American adversary jurisprudence as we know it today.
131
 
 
1061, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (―[A]n amicus curiae is not a party and has no control over the 
litigation and no right to institute any proceedings in it . . . [p]articipation is restricted to 
suggestions relative to matters apparent on the record . . . .‖) (citing Michigan, 940 F.2d at 
163–64, and its disapproval of ―legal mutant‖ called the ―litigating amicus curiae‖); 
Simard, supra note 3, at 694. A survey of federal judges published in 2008 found that most 
of them opposed the idea of ―litigating amicus curiae.‖ Id. (―Not surprisingly, the respond-
ents at all levels of the federal judiciary do not see tremendous utility in litigating amici. 
Specifically, 90.9% of Circuit Court respondents and 89% of District Court respondents 
indicated that litigating amici are a hindrance or a neutral consideration in litigation. Two 
Supreme Court respondents indicated that litigating amici would be a hindrance.‖). 
 128. Michigan, 940 F.2d at 145–46. 
 129. Id. at 146. 
 130. Id. at 147. 
 131. Id. at 164. The court went on to say: 
Neither the appellees nor the trial court have advanced, beyond conclusory 
generalizations and conjecture, a persuasive argument that the trial court‘s 
―litigating amicus curiae‖ order, whatever that term implies, does not seri-
ously impinge the inherent rights of the only real parties in interest to this 
CRIPA litigation between the United States and Michigan. The district 
court‘s order has, by extrajudicial edict, impressed upon the United States 
and Michigan a third-party legal interloper in the persona of the NPP–ACLU 
and the ACLUFM acting through their structured willing surrogate, the 
Knop class, all of whom had been denied real-party-in-interest status and 
whose efforts to achieve that end had been earlier barred by the trial court. 
The legal consequence of the district court‘s order was to achieve, by circum- 
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* * * * * 
The amicus curiae types outlined above are not perfectly dis-
tinct. The discussion of governmental amici refers to a particular 
type of actor, rather than its role in the litigation, and govern-
mental amici may be a Friend of a Party, an Invited Friend, or an 
Independent Friend. The Near Intervenor or Invited Friend may 
also have an interest in the legal precedent set, and its interests 
may align with a party so that it is also a Friend of a Party. Nev-
ertheless, despite possible overlap, the categories are helpful in 
developing a clearer analysis of the role of amici curiae. 
III.  THE BARE CONSTRAINTS 
Amicus briefs must comply with the applicable court rules,
132
 
but amicus curiae brief writers have great flexibility in choosing 
what issues to address and how to address them. Due dates and 
page limits vary with the jurisdiction, and these variations can 
greatly affect how amici curiae participate.
 
Criteria for amicus 
curiae participation are fairly relaxed in most courts, and the 
prevailing judicial attitude, with a few exceptions, is one of com-
placency. 
A.  The Amicus Curiae Brief 
1.  Content 
Amici curiae, of whatever type, have great flexibility in the ar-
guments and factual material they present to the court. Given 
how strictly courts apply the rules of evidence, waiver, and stand-
ing to the parties, the freedom accorded amici curiae is striking. 
Although the parties are limited in their factual arguments to 
what is in the appellate court record and permitted by the rules of 
evidence below, amici curiae routinely present ―legislative facts‖ 
in support of policy arguments.
133
 They can also present what 
 
vention, a result that effectively and impermissibly abused all conventional 
laws and judicial rules of civil practice and procedure for acquiring the status 
and rights of a named party/real party in interest, including Fed. R. Civ. P. 
14 and 17 through 25. 
Id. 
 132. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 133. Id. at 675 & n.24. One of the first examples of this type of amicus curiae brief is  
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amounts to testimony by individuals who were not involved in the 
case.
134
 This type of ―new information‖ is frequently cited as the 
benefit of amici curiae; it is precisely this information—not put 
forward by the parties—that is said to be of assistance to the 
court.
135
 The more general the information provided, the less con-
troversial, especially in an era when courts can easily conduct 
their own Internet research. Yet there is an argument that even 
the presentation of new ―legislative facts‖ in amicus briefs under-
cuts the adversarial process and encourages appellate court ―ex-
tra-record factfinding.‖
136
 Legislative facts introduced in this way 
are not tested in the way that they might be were they introduced 
and argued about in the trial court.
137
 
But even if amici curiae can freely present legislative facts, 
should amici curiae be allowed to submit new facts about the par-
ticular dispute at issue?
138
 This is precisely the type of evidence 
the Near Intervenor might want to present. For example, a near-
by landowner may want to bring in new facts about a dispute be-
tween two other landowners, or a crime victim might want to tell 
the court additional (or different) facts about the crime and its ef-
fect. We presume that judges, unlike juries, can distinguish be-
tween admissible and inadmissible information and that they will 
disregard what is not permissible, even on appeal. But with cer-
tain information, it may be just as difficult to ―unring the bell‖ for 
judges as for jurors.
139
 A party can move to strike an amicus brief 
 
Louis Brandeis‘s brief in Muller v. Oregon. See infra note 151. 
 134. Larsen, supra note 19, at 25. An example is the brief filed by the National Abor-
tion Rights Action League in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists. Lynn M. Paltrow, Amicus Brief: Richard Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists, 9 WOMEN‘S RTS. L. REP. 3, 4–5 (1986). The brief consisted 
largely of personal accounts by women who had undergone abortions. Id. at 4. In another 
example, in Gratz v. Bollinger, a brief filed on behalf of military commanders described the 
history and importance of diversity in the military. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius 
W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516). 
 135. Simard, supra note 3, at 682, 690. Even Judge Posner agrees that amicus curiae 
briefs should be permitted ―when amicus has unique information or perspective that can 
help the court . . . .‖ Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
 136. See Gorod, supra note 19, at 37; Larsen, supra note 19, at 42. 
 137. See Gorod, supra note 19, at 60–61. 
 138. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 60, at 291 (discussing the difference between ―legisla-
tive facts,‖ which amici curiae should be allowed to present, and ―nonrecord facts‖ about 
the particular dispute at issue, which no party or amicus curiae should be allowed to in-
troduce on appeal). 
 139. See Alan Hirsch, Confessions and Harmless Error: A New Argument for the Old 
Approach, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 14 (2007) (arguing that confessions have an impact  
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with improper factual material, but the damage may already be 
done. 
Some trial court judges, aware that amici curiae—particularly 
amici curiae with their own private interests, i.e., Near Interve-
nors—may wish to introduce new evidence, preemptively direct 
amici curiae not to introduce ―extra-record materials.‖
140
 In appel-
late courts, factual review is already limited to what has been 
made part of the record below
141
—but the line between the record 
and the wide world of Internet and book research is hard to draw. 
It is clear that an amicus curiae is free to take risks with crossing 
that line. Since an amicus will not be directly bound by the court‘s 
judgment,
142
 it has less to lose if it irritates the court with new 
facts. 
Amici curiae have a similar freedom with their arguments and 
thus may raise arguments that the parties would be foreclosed 
from making.
143
 Again, these new arguments are often considered 
a benefit to the court. The Supreme Court has considered new is-
sues raised first by an amicus curiae,
144
 and even appoints amici 
curiae—of the Court‘s Lawyer variety—to consider issues aban-
doned or never raised by the parties.
145
 
Most other courts distinguish between entirely new issues—
which an amicus curiae may not present—and theories in support 
of issues raised by the parties. As a Florida court said, in refusing 
to consider new issues raised by amici curiae, 
A significant distinction is apparent as between ―issues‖ and ―theo-
ries‖ in support of a particular issue. Amicus is not confined solely to 
arguing the parties‘ theories in support of a particular issue. To so 
confine amicus would be to place him in a position of parroting ―me 
 
on appellate judges reviewing challenges to convictions). 
 140. Wilderness Soc‘y v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 09-CV-08010-PCT-PGR, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74709, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2010); see also NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Up-
stream Point Molate, LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
 141. DANIEL J. MEADOR & JORDANA S. BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2, 55 (1994). 
 142. See Sorenson, supra note 8, at 1238. 
 143. Simard, supra note 3, at 674–75. Many state jurisdictions will not consider new 
issues raised only by amicus curiae. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, 
has decided cases based on the arguments of amicus on a number of occasions. See infra 
Part III.B.1. 
 144. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 145. See supra Part II.B. 
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too‖ which would result in his not being able to contribute anything 
to the court by his participation in the cause.
146
 
As the Florida court further observed, if amici curiae hew too 
close to the facts and arguments presented by the parties, they 
risk having their submissions perceived as ―me too‖ briefs that 
add nothing but their ―vote‖ to one side or the other.
147
 Although 
such briefs are often derided as providing little assistance to the 
court, some litigants frankly acknowledge their usefulness as an 
―endorsement.‖
148
 As one amicus brief author stated, ―Its purpose 
is to tell the court that we agree with the appellant and we hope 
it will decide in his favor.‖
149
 While such signaling may have a 
valuable democratic function in the federal courts, it is more 
problematic in state courts with an elected bench. Should such 
lobbying of the state courts be permitted?
150
 
Finally, as nonparties with less at stake than the parties to the 
dispute, amici curiae enjoy a certain freedom to innovate in brief-
writing. It was amicus curiae that filed the first Brandeis brief,
151
 
the first electronic brief in the Supreme Court
152
 and the first 
 
 146. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 60, at 291 (quoting Keating v. State, 157 So. 2d 567, 
569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)). 
 147. Keating, 157 So. 2d at 569. 
 148. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 203. 
 149. Krislov, supra note 4, at 712 (quoting an exchange between Charles Abrams and 
Newman Levy of the American Jewish Committee). Levy also said that if his brief repeat-
ed the arguments of the appellant, and the court relied on those arguments in its ruling, 
―We would be able to say to our members, ‗Isn‘t that exactly what we told the court?‘‖ Id. 
at 713. 
 150. In 1927, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin believed there was something reprehen-
sible about a direct attempt to influence the court through an amicus brief by weighty sig-
natories. In re Stolen, 214 N.W. 379, 387 (Wis. 1927). Of course, powerful interests can 
always make their views known in another forum if the amicus curiae route is foreclosed. 
They might write op-ed pieces in the paper, for example. In some ways, the amicus brief 
simply allows those interest groups to make their views known in a more transparent way. 
 151. Louis Brandeis‘s brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), celebrated as an 
innovation for its reliance on social science rather than legal argument, was more like an 
amicus brief. Although Brandeis filed his brief on behalf of the State of Oregon, the state 
attorney general also filed a traditional brief devoted to legal argument, with citation. Da-
vid E. Bernstein, Brandeis Brief Myths, 15 GREEN BAG 2d 9, 12 (2011). 
 152. In 1995, a law professor attempted to file a hyperlinked amicus brief with the 
Court, but it was rejected. Michael Whiteman, Appellate Court Briefs on the Web: Electron-
ic Dynamos or Legal Quagmire?, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 467, 469 n.16 (2005). The Court accepted 
a hyperlinked CD-ROM amicus brief the next year, however. See Brief of Amici Curiae 
Am. Ass‘n of Univ. Professors, et al., in Support of Appellees, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997) (No. 96-511), 1997 WL 74396. See generally Elizabeth Porter, Taking Images Seri-
ously, ___ COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing images in written legal argu-
ment). 
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graphic (comic book) brief in federal court.
153
 As one scholar com-
mented on the graphic brief, ―[A]mici may feel more freedom to 
experiment with traditional legal forms given their quasi-outsider 
status to litigation.‖
154
 No attorney representing a party to the lit-
igation would take the chance of filing a ―comic book‖ brief on the 
merits. 
2. Due Dates and Page Limits 
Like the rules in most courts, Rule 37 of the Rules of the Su-
preme Court of the United States seems based on the assumption 
that amicus briefs will be in support of a party and bases filing 
deadlines on that assumption. The rule requires an amicus curiae 
brief to be filed within seven days of the filing of the merits brief 
by the party it supports ―or if in support of neither party, within 7 
days after the time allowed for filing the petitioner‘s or appel-
lant‘s brief.‖
155
 Amicus briefs in the Supreme Court are limited to 
9000 words, while parties‘ briefs can be up to 15,000 words.
156
 The 
federal courts of appeals have a similar seven-day deadline
157
 and 
limit the amicus brief to one-half the length limit for a party‘s 
brief on the merits.
158
 
Similarly, in most states, the rules seem to anticipate close co-
operation between amici curiae and a party, even in states where 
amici curiae are exhorted to be true friends of the court. A signifi-
cant number of states require the amicus brief to be filed at the 
same time as the brief of the party that the amicus curiae sup-
ports.
159
 Another group requires the brief to be filed within seven 
days of the party‘s brief.
160
 Others give the amicus curiae a longer 
 
 153. Brief of Bob Kohn as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F.2d 638 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-2826), available at http://www.abajournal.com/files/AppleAmicus 
Brief.pdf. 
 154. Porter, supra note 152, at 46. 
 155. SUP. CT. R. 37.3(a). The rule also specifies deadlines for an amicus curiae brief 
filed in support of the granting of certiorari. SUP. CT. R. 37.2. 
 156. SUP. CT. R. 33.1(g). 
 157. FED. R. APP. P. 29(e). 
 158. FED. R. APP. P. 29(d). 
 159. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 345(b); IND. R. APP. P. 41(b); IOWA R. APP. P. 6.906(1); 
LA. SUP. CT. R. 7(12); MASS. R. APP. P. 17; MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.05(f)(2); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 
30(1); N.C. APP. R. 28(i); OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.12(d)(1); PA. R. APP. P. 531(a)(1); R.I. SUP. 
CT. R. 16(h); VT. R. APP. P. 29(c); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:30(d); W. VA. R. APP. P. 30(d). 
 160. See, e.g., DEL. SUP. CT. R. 28(e); MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 129.02; MISS. R. APP. P. 
29(b); NEV. R. APP. P. 29(f); N.M. R. APP. 12-215(c); OR. R. APP. P. 8.15(4); UTAH R. APP. P. 
25. 
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time to file its brief. 
161
 If amici curiae and the parties want to be 
sure that they do not duplicate each other, those with similar 
deadlines will need to cooperate. Same time filing also allows the 
parties to address the arguments of opposing amici curiae in their 
own responding or reply briefs. Where amici curiae have later 
deadlines, the parties may need to file additional responding 
briefs, if allowed. 
The page limits for amicus briefs also say something about the 
states‘ view of amicus curiae participation. Like the federal 
courts, several states limit amicus briefs to one-half the length al-
lowed for the party they support.
162
 A few others have fairly re-
strictive numerical limits of fifteen
163
 or twenty
164
 pages. But other 
states allow amici curiae to file lengthy briefs.
165
 These page lim-
its appear especially generous when one remembers that amicus 
briefs need not include a statement of the case, nor address every 
issue presented by the parties. 
With the filing of the brief, amicus curiae participation is over. 
Amici curiae do not have standing to file appellate motions, such 
as a motion for reconsideration or a motion to strike.
166
 Amici cu-
riae have no right to demand that their arguments be considered 
by the court. Amicus curiae participation in oral argument is ra-
re.
167
 And amici may not file a reply to a party‘s response to the 
 
 161. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f) (requiring filing within thirty days after all parties‘ 
briefs are filed); CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 67-7 (2014 ed.) (requiring filing within twenty days 
of the filing of the brief of the party whom amicus supports); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 6.06(b)(1) 
(requiring filing within thirty days before oral argument); ME. R. APP. P. 9(e)(1) (requiring 
filing the same day as brief of appellee); NEB. CT. R. 2-109(A)(4) (requiring filing within 
twenty days before oral argument); WASH. R. APP. P. 10.2(f) (requiring filing within forty-
five days before oral argument). 
 162. See, e.g., IOWA R. APP. P. 6.906(3); NEV. R. APP. P. 29(e). 
 163. See KY. R. CIV. P. 76.12; MISS. R. APP. P. 29(b). 
 164. See LA. SUP. CT. R. 7-12; WASH. R. APP. P. 10.4(b). 
 165. See ME. R. APP. P. 9(e)(1) (allowing fifty pages); WYO. R. APP. P. 7.12(d) (allowing 
thirty-five pages). At one time, West Virginia had no page limit on amicus briefs, and a 
judge noted that one amicus brief was ―certified by the Clerk of [] Court as weighing one 
and three-eighths pounds.‖ Amy M. Smith, The History and Evolution of Amicus Curiae in 
West Virginia, W. VA. LAW., Sept. 2013, at 42, 44 (quoting City of Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pon-
tiac-Cadillac Co., 308 S.E.2d 527, 539–40 (W. Va. 1983)). In the words of the judge, ―[s]ome 
friend.‖ City of Fairmont, 308 S.E.2d at 540. 
 166. See SUP. CT. R. 37.3. (―The Clerk will not file a reply brief for an amicus curiae, or 
a brief for an amicus curiae in support of, or in opposition to, a petition for rehearing.‖) 
But see GA. SUP. CT. R. 23 (―Amici do not have standing to file motions for reconsideration, 
but may submit briefs in support of a motion made by a party.‖). 
 167. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29(g) (―An amicus curiae may participate in oral argu-
ment only with the court‘s permission.‖); ALASKA R. APP. P. 212(9) (―A motion of an amicus 
curiae to participate in the oral argument will be granted only for extraordinary rea- 
390 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:361 
 
amicus brief.
168
 Nevertheless, in filing a brief on the merits, ami-
cus curiae at the appellate level are allowed to do almost as much 
as the parties. 
B.  Judicial Attitudes Toward Amicus  
Courts do not seem to distinguish between the various types of 
amicus curiae. The fuzziness of the amicus curiae category is in 
striking contrast to the complex and constraining rules of proce-
dure that govern who can be a party and what issues may be 
raised by whom.
169
 Most judges are probably welcoming—or at the 
very least complacent—about amicus curiae participation. But 
whether judges praise amicus curiae contributions or complain 
about amicus brief abuse, they do not articulate rules that distin-
guish between, for example, Near Intervenors, Friends of a Party, 
or Independent Friends. Instead, they discuss loose concepts such 
as ―helpfulness to the court,‖ or they appeal to the concept of 
friendliness.
170
 Nor do the court rules governing amicus curiae 
participation make clear distinctions between the various types of 
amici. 
1.  Supreme Court of the United States 
The current rule governing amicus curiae in the Supreme 
Court states: 
An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court rele-
vant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may 
 
sons.‖); ARK. SUP. CT. R. 4-6(b) (―Amici Curiae attorneys will not be permitted to partici-
pate in oral arguments.‖). 
 168. E.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29(f). 
 169. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 
1670 (2007) (―[T]he various Article III justiciability doctrines—standing, ripeness, moot-
ness, political question, advisory opinions—all try to define the contours of the case-or-
controversy limitation.‖). 
 170. See, e.g., Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544–45 (7th Cir. 
2003); Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm‘r of Labor & Indus., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982); Neonatol-
ogy Assocs., P.A. v. Comm‘r., 293 F.3d 128, 132–33 (3rd Cir. 2002); Wildearth Guardians v. 
Lane, No. CIV 12-118 LFG/KBM, 2012 WL 10028647, at *2 (D.N.M. June 20, 2012); N. 
Mariana Islands v. United States, 2009 WL 596986, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2009); Triad 
Int‘l Maint. Corp. v. S. Air Transp., Inc., 2005 WL 1917512, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 
2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 2006 Ill. LEXIS 1, at *2 (Ill. Jan. 11, 2006); see also 
Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Justices Are Paying More Attention to Amicus 
Briefs, NAT‘L L. JOURNAL (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/printerfri 
endly/id=1202668846551 (discussing Justices‘ views on amicus briefs). 
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be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does 
not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not fa-
vored.
171
 
The rule‘s emphases on ―relevant matter‖ and ―help‖ suggest 
that the Court is looking for factual and/or policy expertise. In 
practice, however, the Court liberally permits amicus brief fil-
ings,
172
 many of which are more in the nature of petitions or votes 
for one side or the other. But in an effort to perhaps better assess 
the credibility of the amicus curiae effort, the rule also requires 
disclosure of any connections to a party: 
Except for briefs presented on behalf of amicus curiae listed in Rule 
37.4 [federal, state or local governments], a brief filed under this 
Rule shall indicate whether counsel for a party authored the brief in 
whole or in part and whether such counsel or a party made a mone-
tary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of 
the brief, and shall identify every person other than the amicus curi-
ae, its members, or its counsel, who made such a monetary contribu-
tion.
173
 
This subsection, amended in 1997,
174
 has not slowed the growth 
of amicus brief filings. 
The Court will sometimes consider arguments raised for the 
first time by amici curiae. In 1998, this practice prompted a D.C. 
Circuit judge to express his disagreement with a Supreme Court 
decision remanding the case to the circuit court on the basis of 
arguments raised only by amicus curiae: 
What is so remarkable about the Court‘s decision to vacate our deci-
sion and remand . . . is that the linchpin of the Court‘s decision is an 
argument—pressed by an amicus curiae (ostensibly, as a jurisdic-
tional objection)—upon which the FEC did not rely in declining to 
 
 171. SUP. CT. R. 37.1. 
 172. See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text.  
 173. SUP. CT. R. 37.6; see 1AA WEST‘S FED. FORMS § 438 cmt. 257–58 (1998). (―Rule 
37.6 militates strongly against the covering up or masking of sources of views which are 
being placed before the Court in amicus curiae briefs. In the past it has been in no way 
unusual for parties to a case to stir up amicus support and to undertake to bear the mone-
tary costs which the amicus would otherwise find it necessary to pay for having a brief 
prepared and filed. Likewise, it has not been unusual for a party to say to the prospective 
amicus that the party would be glad to have the party‘s lawyers prepare a draft of an ami-
cus brief which the amicus can then file in its own name. Rule 37.6 does not outlaw such 
practices. But it requires that the facts be disclosed, so that the Court will have infor-
mation helpful in assessing the credibility to be attached to the views submitted by the 
amicus.‖). 
 174. Id., amended by Act of May 1, 1997, ___ U.S.C.S. SUP. CT. R. 37.6; see Steven Fi-
nell, Appellate Rules and Statutes Focus: Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, 28 APP. PRAC. J. 4, 5 (2009). 
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bring enforcement proceedings . . . , and which therefore forms no 
part of the agency decision that the district court, we, and the Su-
preme Court reviewed . . . . I recognize that the Supreme Court has 
moved pretty far from traditional notions of judicial restraint that 
confine courts to issues presented by the parties, but I think this de-
cision represents another large step in that regrettable process.
175
 
There are other instances of the Supreme Court deciding cases 
based on issues raised by amici curiae.
176
 Yet other Supreme 
Court cases hold that the Court will not consider arguments 
raised only by amici curiae. As one recent opinion put it, ―Because 
this argument was not raised by the parties or passed on by the 
lower courts, we do not consider it.‖
177
 In the Supreme Court, 
therefore, precedent is mixed. 
In the early 1950s, Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Hugo 
Black differed on how restrictive the amicus curiae rules should 
be, with Justice Black‘s view ultimately prevailing. 
178
 Decades 
later, Justice Antonin Scalia commented in one case on the lop-
sided, and what he perceived as self-interested, participation of 
amicus curiae. Dissenting from the Court‘s decision establishing a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, he wrote: 
In its consideration of this case, the Court was the beneficiary of no 
fewer than 14 amicus briefs supporting respondents, most of which 
came from such organizations as the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the American Associ-
ation of State Social Work Boards, the Employee Assistance Profes-
sionals Association, Inc., the American Counseling Association, and 
the National Association of Social Workers. Not a single amicus cu-
riae brief was filed in support of petitioner. That is no surprise. 
There is no self-interested organization out there devoted to pursuit 
of the truth in the federal courts.
179
 
 
 175. Akins v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 146 F.3d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 176. In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court applied the exclusionary rule at the suggestion of ami-
cus: ―Other issues have been raised on this appeal but, in the view we have taken of the 
case, they need not be decided. Although appellant chose to urge what may have appeared 
to be the surer ground for favorable disposition and did not insist that Wolf be overruled, 
the amicus curiae, who was also permitted to participate in the oral argument, did urge 
the Court to overrule Wolf.‖ 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.3 (1961); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288, 300 (1988) (addressing the question of retroactivity of habeas petitioner‘s claim de-
spite the fact that the retroactivity issue was raised only in an amicus brief). 
 177. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1011 & 
n.4 (2013) (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981)). 
 178. Krislov, supra note 4, at 714–15; Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24, at 784–85. 
 179. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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As with many matters, and as these instances suggest, the 
views of individual Justices on amicus curiae participation are 
not likely uniform. 
2.  Federal Courts of Appeals 
As in the Supreme Court, an amicus brief may be filed in a fed-
eral court of appeals with the consent of the parties or by permis-
sion of the court.
180
 The rule also requires the kind of disclosure 
required in the Supreme Court.
181
 But the appellate court rule re-
quires the would-be amicus curiae to show not only its interest 
and why a brief is desirable, but also ―why the matters asserted 
are relevant to the disposition of the case.‖
182
 The comments to 
this subsection state, ―Because the relevance of the matters as-
serted by an amicus is ordinarily the most compelling reason for 
granting leave to file, the Committee believes that it is helpful to 
 
 180. FED. R. APP. P. 29 provides in part: 
(a) When Permitted. The United States or its officer or agency or a state 
may file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the parties or leave of 
court. Any other amicus curiae may file a brief only by leave of court or if the 
brief states that all parties have consented to its filing. 
(b) Motion for Leave to File. The motion must be accompanied by the pro-
posed brief and state: 
(1) the movant's interest; and 
(2) the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the matters asserted 
are relevant to the disposition of the case. 
(c) Contents and Form. . . . An amicus brief . . . must include the following: 
(1) if the amicus curiae is a corporation, a disclosure statement like that re-
quired of parties by Rule 26.1; . . . 
(5) unless the amicus curiae is one listed in the first sentence of Rule 29(a), a 
statement that indicates whether: 
(A) a party's counsel authored the brief in whole or in part; 
(B) a party or a party's counsel contributed money that was intended 
to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and 
(C) a person--other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its coun-
sel--contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or sub-
mitting the brief and, if so, identifies each such person. 
 181. Compare SUP. CT. R. 37.6 (requiring disclosure of ―whether counsel for a party au-
thored the brief in whole or in part, and whether such counsel or a party made a monetary 
contribution intended to fund the preparations or submission of the brief‖ and disclosure 
of the identity of ―every person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, 
who made such a monetary contribution‖), with FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5) (requiring an indi-
cation of ―whether: (A) a party‘s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part; (B) a party 
or party‘s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting 
the brief; and (C) a person—other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel—
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief and, if so, 
identifies each such person . . . .‖). 
 182. FED. R. APP. P. 29(b)(2). 
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explicitly require such a showing.‖
183
 Other than singling out the 
government for favored status as an amicus curiae—as in all ju-
risdictions—the rule does not distinguish between the different 
types of amicus curiae. 
Aside from the rule and comments, the federal courts of ap-
peals—with a few notable exceptions—have not said much about 
the desirability or undesirability of amicus briefs.
184
 The lower 
federal courts have not always adopted the Supreme Court‘s open 
door policy, and occasionally a strong dissent is lodged.
185
 In one 
case, Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit dissented from the denial of a mo-
tion by a group of law professors to file an amicus brief, and his 
principle argument was that the courts should welcome assis-
tance that could help them avoid error.
186
 Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit once commented, in rejecting an argument against amicus 
briefs, 
These amici . . . take a legal position and present legal arguments in 
support of it, a perfectly permissible role for an amicus. See Miller-
Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industry, 694 F.2d 203, 204 
(9th Cir. 1982) (amici fulfill the classic role of amicus curiae by as-
sisting in a case of general public interest, supplementing the assist-
ing in a case of general public interest, supplementing the efforts of 
counsel, and drawing the court‘s attention to law that might other-
wise escape consideration). Moreover, we have stated that there is no 
rule that amici must be totally disinterested.
187
 
The Ninth Circuit also stressed the difference between amici 
curiae and parties in another case, denying an amicus curiae re-
quest for attorneys‘ fees.
188
 The court determined that amici curi-
ae appointed by the court (Invited Friends, although the court did 
not use that term) could be paid for their efforts by the court, but 
otherwise amici curiae were ―volunteers, not appointees.‖
189
 
 
 183. Id. Advisory Committee‘s Notes. 
 184. Interestingly, federal judges themselves are not always allowed to appear as an 
amicus curiae. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 934, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (denying the unop-
posed motion of retired federal jurists for leave to file amici in support of the petitioners 
regarding the Military Commissions Act of 2006). 
 185. See id. at 935 (Rogers, J., dissenting); see also Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1983) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
 186. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d at 645. 
 187. Funbus Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm‘n, 801 F.2d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 188. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm‘r of Labor & Indus., 649 F.2d 203, 204–05 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
 189. Id. at 205. 
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Yet, because amicus briefs may be filed in federal court with 
the agreement of the parties
190
 and therefore escape any pub-
lished judicial commentary on their usefulness or desirability, it 
is difficult to be certain of judicial attitudes overall.
191
 
A few federal judges have strong views about amicus briefs. 
Judge Posner‘s restrictive preferences are widely known. He once 
explained his reasons for denying an amicus brief, relying in part 
on the word ―friend‖: 
After 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast majority of 
which have not assisted the judges, I have decided that it would be 
good to scrutinize these motions in a more careful, indeed a fish-
eyed, fashion. 
     The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of liti-
gants and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants‘ briefs, in 
effect merely extending the length of the litigant‘s brief. Such amicus 
briefs should not be allowed. They are an abuse. The term “amicus 
curiae” means friend of the court, not friend of a party. We are be-
yond the original meaning now; an adversary role of an amicus curi-
ae has become accepted. But there are, or at least there should be, 
limits.
192
 
Judge Posner opined that amicus briefs should only be allowed 
when a party is not represented competently or is not represented at 
all, when the amicus has an interest in some other case that may be 
affected by the decision in the present case (though not enough af-
fected to entitle the amicus to intervene and become a party in the 
present case), or when the amicus has unique information or per-
spective that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for 
the parties are able to provide.
193
 
Judge Posner‘s definition of amicus curiae would thus include 
the Near Intervenor, but exclude the most common type of amicus 
curiae—the Friend of a Party—unless that friend had unique in-
formation or perspective.
194
 In a 2003 case, Judge Posner, as Chief 
 
 190. FED. R. APP. 29(a). 
 191. See, e.g., Gidiere, supra note 62, at 1–2; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 745–
46 (explaining the varying judicial opinions on the importance of amicus curiae briefs and 
noting the lack of judicial consensus on their role). 
 192. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 193. Id. 
 194. This hostility toward Friend of the Party amicus is also reflected in Sierra Club, 
Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2004): 
The Chamber does not have ―an interest relating to the property or transac-
tion which is the subject of the action‖; its concern is not a legal ―interest‖ 
(the permit at stake affects only one power plant) but a political or program- 
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Judge for the Seventh Circuit, denied permission for state legisla-
tors to file an amicus brief on the validity of a state statute.
195
 
Judge Posner reasoned that the legislators did not represent the 
state itself, and ―[t]he fact that powerful public officials or busi-
ness or labor organizations support or oppose an appeal is a da-
tum that is irrelevant to judicial decision making, except in a few 
cases, of which this not one, in which the position of a nonparty 
has legal significance.‖
196
 
Judge Posner‘s views found opposition from then-Third Circuit 
Judge Samuel Alito, who explained that while traditional defini-
tions of amicus curiae included the term ―impartial,‖ the current 
rule
197
 required that the amicus have an ―interest‖ in the litiga-
tion and that such an interest—even a pecuniary interest—was 
not inconsistent with the role of assisting the court in an adver-
sary process.
198
 Moreover, Judge Alito noted that ―the time re-
quired for skeptical scrutiny of proposed amicus briefs may equal, 
if not exceed, the time that would have been needed to study the 
briefs at the merits stage if leave had been granted.‖
199
 Screening 
is just not worth the effort. Under this view, amicus curiae partic-
ipation need not be policed, no matter what type of amicus curiae 
is involved. 
Most federal appellate judges are not concerned about amicus 
curiae abuse. The rate of amicus curiae participation is actually 
not great. Then-Judge Alito pointed out that amicus curiae were 
hardly overwhelming the courts of appeals. He noted that less 
than 10% of cases that resulted in opinions (in itself a small por-
tion of the total number of cases) had even one amicus brief 
filed.
200
 A survey of federal appellate judges showed that around 
 
matic one: the Chamber favors more business and less environmental regula-
tion. That does not justify intervention. Indeed, it does not necessarily justify 
even a filing as amicus curiae. Courts value submissions not to see how the 
interest groups line up, but to learn about facts and legal perspectives that 
the litigants have not adequately developed. 
 195. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 543–46 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 196. Id. at 545. 
 197. FED. R. APP. 29. 
 198. Neonatology Assocs. v. Comm‘r, 293 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 199. Id. at 133; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 934, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reject-
ing an amicus brief by retired federal judges). 
 200. Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 133 n.2 (―During the past year, private amici 
were listed as appearing in fewer than 10% of our court‘s opinions in the Federal Reporter. 
And since (a) the great majority of our cases are decided without such opinions and (b) 
amici are much more likely in the sort of cases that do result in Federal Reporter opinions, 
the percentage of all of our cases in which private amici appear or seek to appear is plainly  
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80% believed that amicus briefs were filed in 5% or less of their 
cases.
201
 Only twelve circuit court judges believed that 15% or 
more of their cases involved amicus curiae.
202
 
3.  State Courts 
All state courts allow amicus briefs in their courts of last re-
sort. Many state court rules or statutes are modeled after Rule 37 
of the Rules of the Supreme Court or Rule 29 of the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure.
203
 But the state rules vary in ways that 
show different visions and concerns about amicus briefs. For the 
most part, the rules are relaxed and do not distinguish between 
types of friends, but there are a few exceptions. 
A person or group receives permission to file an amicus brief 
when appointed at the court‘s request, when all parties consent, 
or when the person or group‘s motion to file a brief is granted.
204
 
All three routes to permission can be followed in the federal 
courts. In the state courts, around fifteen states allow amicus cu-
riae to file with the consent of the parties or by court permis-
sion,
205
 but most refer only to the permission or leave of the 
court.
206
 In Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Texas, the rules appear to 
give amicus curiae the right to file a brief without advance per-
mission, although the Texas court can refuse the brief ―for good 
cause shown.‖
207
 Regardless of what the rules say, courts always 
retain inherent power to appoint amicus curiae. 
For applicants who must seek permission by motion to appear 
as amicus curiae, the rules are mostly general about the neces-
sary showing. The most common statement of the applicant‘s 
showing is borrowed from Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of the Ap-
pellate Procedure, that the motion must ―identify the interest of 
 
only a small fraction of 10%.‖). 
 201. Simard, supra note 3, at 686. 
 202. Id. at 686–87. 
 203. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 204. See infra notes 205–07. 
 205. See ALASKA R. APP. P. 212(a)(9); ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16(a); IOWA R. APP. P. 
6.906(1); ME. R. APP. P. 9(e)(1); MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.05(f); NEV. R. APP. P. 29(a); N.H. SUP. 
CT. R. 30(1); OHIO APP. R. 17; OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.12(a); R.I. SUP. CT. R. 16(h); VT. R. APP. 
P. 29(a); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:30(b)(2); WASH. R. APP. P. 10.6(a); W. VA. R. APP. P. 30(a). 
 206. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f); COLO. APP. R. 29; DEL. SUP. CT. R. 28(a); MASS. R. 
APP. P. 17; TENN. R. APP. P. 31(a). 
 207. GA. SUP. CT. R. 23; PENN. R. APP. P. 531(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 11. 
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the applicant, and shall state the reasons why the brief of an 
amicus curiae is desirable.‖
208
 A few states add criteria to these 
required showings such as stating ―why the matters asserted are 
relevant to the disposition of the case‖
209
 or ―that the applicant 
has read the relevant brief, petition or motion.‖
210
 A number of 
states provide no required showing in their court rule,
211
 although 
court decisions in those states may limit amicus curiae participa-
tion.
212
 
Some states require more specificity in the application about 
the issues to be addressed. Examples of what court rules require 
a petitioner to state include: matters of fact or law that might 
otherwise escape the court‘s attention;
213
 facts or questions of law 
that have not been, or reasons for believing that they will not ad-
equately be, presented by the parties and their relevancy to the 
disposition of the case;
214
 facts or questions of law which may not 
be presented adequately by the litigants;
215
 and specific issues to 
which the amicus curiae brief will be directed, and an applicant‘s 
reason for believing that additional argument is necessary on 
these specific issues.
216
 These rules suggest an effort to discourage 
―me too‖ Friend of a Party briefs. 
A few states require additional information about the appli-
cant‘s interest in the case, in what seems to be an effort to tease 
out the private and public interests involved. Minnesota, for ex-
ample, seeks to know whether the interest is public or private.
217
 
New Jersey asks to know the issue to be addressed, ―the nature of 
the public interest therein and the nature of the applicant‘s spe-
 
 208. ALA. R. APP. P. 29; ALASKA R. APP. P. 212(9); COLO. APP. R. 29; ME. R. APP. P. 9 
(e)(1); MASS. R. APP. P. 17; OHIO APP. R. 17; R.I. SUP. CT. R. 16(h); S.C. APP. CT. R. 213; 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-26A-74 (2014); see also CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 67-7 (2014 ed.); 
NEV. R. APP. P. 29(c); UTAH R. APP. P. 25; VT. R. APP. P. 29(b); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 809.19(7) 
(West 2014) (with very slight modifications of the text). 
 209. DEL. S. CT. R. 28(b)(2); N.D. R. APP. P. 29(b)(2); W.VA. R. APP. P. 30(c). 
 210. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16(a). 
 211. See HAW. R. APP. P. 28(g); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 6.06; NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-109; PA. 
R. APP. P. 531; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:30. 
 212. See, e.g., In re Scheidmantel, 868 A.2d 464, 478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (―An amicus 
curiae is not a party and cannot raise issues which have not been preserved and raised by 
the parties themselves.‖). 
 213. LA. SUP. CT. R. 7:12; see MISS. R. APP. P. 29(a). 
 214. MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.05(f); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 30(2). 
 215. OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.12(b)(2). 
 216. WASH. R. APP. P. 10.6(b)(3), (4). 
 217. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 129.01. 
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cial interest, involvement or expertise in respect thereof.‖
218
 Ore-
gon asks the applicant to explain whether it ―intends to present a 
private interest of its own, or to present a position as to the cor-
rect rule of law that does not affect a private interest of its 
own.‖
219
 But these rules do not suggest that a private interest dis-
qualifies an application for amicus curiae status. They do not ac-
tually articulate a distinction between the Near Intervenor and 
the Friend of a Party amicus curiae, but come close. 
A few states set forth a more restrictive list of criteria.
220
 The 
Mississippi and Louisiana rules require would-be amicus curiae 
to show: 
(1) amicus has an interest in some other case involving a similar 
question; or (2) counsel for a party is inadequate or the brief insuffi-
cient; or (3) there are matters of fact or law that may otherwise es-
cape the court‘s attention; or (4) the amicus has substantial legiti-
mate interests that will likely be affected by the outcome of the case 
and which interests will not be adequately protected by those al-
ready parties to the case.
221
 
The Wyoming rule requires a similar showing, except that the 
factors are joined by ―and‖ rather than ―or‖: 
(1) the movant‘s interest in the issues raised in the case; 
(2) the reasons an amicus brief is appropriate and desirable; 
(3) the view of the movant with respect to whether a party is not rep-
resented competently or is not represented at all; 
(4) the interest of the amicus in some other case that may be affected 
by the decision in the case before the court; and 
(5) any unique information or perspective the amicus has that can be 
of assistance to the court beyond that the lawyers for the parties can 
provide.
222
 
A number of state courts, like the Supreme Court of the United 
States, require disclosure of financial or other ties to the parties. 
For example, the comments to the Arizona rules state that amici 
curiae should ―identify every person or entity, other than the 
amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made a monetary 
contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief.‖
223
 Cali-
 
 218. N.J. GEN. R. 1:13-9(a). 
 219. ORE. R. APP. P. 8.15(1). 
 220. These criteria have been in use for some time in other contexts. See, e.g., Ryan v. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 221. MISS. R. APP. P. 29; LA. SUP. CT. R. 7. 
 222. WYO. R. APP. P. 7.12(b) (emphasis added). 
 223. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt., amended by 2014 Ariz. Ct. Order 0033 (effective  
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fornia requires amici to disclose any party or counsel for a party 
who authored all or part of the brief, and every person—including 
parties or parties‘ counsel—who made a financial contribution to 
the preparation of the brief.
224
 Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia require similar disclo-
sure.
225
 Such disclosure may unmask the party in amicus curiae 
disguise, or at least diminish the credibility of a paid supporter. 
Even states with rules that do not explicitly require disclosure 
of financial support or ties to a party may expect such disclosure 
by amicus applicants. Massachusetts, which does not include 
such disclosure requirements in its rule, has such a requirement 
by case law.
226
 The court noted that because the rule required an 
amicus curiae to ―identify its interest,‖ the authors of an amicus 
brief should have disclosed that the law firm representing amicus 
curiae was also representing one of the parties in another case 
with similar issues.
227
 Many states have language similar to the 
Massachusetts rule,
228
 and one could argue that the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts‘ broad reading of ―interest‖ should 
apply to those states. But parties who are funding amicus curiae 
briefs, or parties‘ counsel who are writing amicus briefs, are un-
likely to read the language that way. 
Arizona goes further than most states in requiring not only fi-
nancial disclosure, but also that ―[c]ounsel for a party should not 
be permitted to write the amicus brief in whole or in part.‖
229
 Ari-
zona‘s rules and comments suggest suspicion of amicus curiae—a 
suspicion that not all have friendly intentions—and a belief that 
amicus curiae should be helpful to the court ―[a]s the name im-
plies.‖
230
 
 
Jan. 1, 2015). 
 224. CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f)(4). 
 225. CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 67-7 (2014 ed.); MD. R. 8-511(b)(1)(E); MINN. R. CIV. APP. 
P. 129.03; N.D. R. APP. P. 29(c)(4); TEX. R. APP. P. 11; W. VA. R. APP. P. 30(e)(5). 
 226. Compare MASS. R. APP. P. 17, (containing no disclosure requirement), with Aspi-
nall v. Phillip Morris Cos., Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 480 n.8 (Mass. 2004) (―A full and honest 
disclosure of the interest of amici is crucial to the fairness and integrity of the appellate 
process . . . [W]e now interpret Rule 17 [of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure] to require this making the disclosure.‖). 
 227. See Aspinall, 813 N.E. 2d at 480 n.8. 
 228. See supra note 208. 
 229. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt. 
 230. Id. 
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Just as state court rules for amicus curiae vary, state court 
judges have expressed varying views on the merits of amicus par-
ticipation. Like Judge Posner, a few state courts appear to be hos-
tile to the Friend of the Party amicus and recur to the meaning of 
―friend of the court.‖
231
 For example, the comments to Arizona 
Rule 16 state, ―As the name implies, an amicus curiae brief should 
assist the Court, not advocate a particular litigant‘s case.‖
232
 More 
commonly, states stress that the function of an amicus curiae is 
to assist the court, not a party, although they acknowledge ―the 
reality that most amicus briefs are in fact a type of adversary in-
tervention rather than objective assistance to the court.‖
233
 Sever-
al Illinois cases state that an amicus curiae is not a party to the 
action but is, instead, a friend of the court. Accordingly, its ―sole 
function [as] an amicus is to advise or to make suggestions to the 
court.‖
234
 These comments show the courts referring back to the 
meaning of the term amicus as ―friend‖ in their attempts to limit 
or shape amicus curiae participation. 
Some states express concern about persons or groups masquer-
ading as amicus curiae when they actually have an interest in the 
outcome of litigation or close ties to one of the parties. As one 
Massachusetts opinion put it: ―Briefs of amicus curiae are intend-
ed to represent the views of non-parties; they are not intended as 
vehicles for parties or their counsel to make additional arguments 
beyond those that fit within the page constraints of their 
briefs.‖
235
 Similarly, the comments to Rule 129.01 of the Minneso-
ta Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure state that ―[t]his rule is in-
tended to encourage the participation of independent amici, and 
to prevent the courts from being misled about the independence 
of amici or being exposed to ‗a mirage of amicus support that real-
ly emanates from the petitioner‘s word processor.‘‖
236
 
 
 231. See, e.g., Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th 
Cir. 1997); Gabriel Tech. Corp., v. Qualcomm Inc., 2012 WL 849167, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 
1, 2012).  
 232. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt. (emphasis added). 
 233. ALA. R. APP. P. 29, cmt.; TENN. R. APP. P. 31, cmt. 
 234. See, e.g., In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 760–61 (Ill. 2003); Burger v. Lutheran Gen. 
Hosp., 759 N.E.2d 533, 557 (Ill. 2001). 
 235. Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 480–81 n.8 (Mass. 2004). 
 236. MINN. R. APP. P. 129.01 Advisory Committee Comments (2000 Amendments); see 
also Stephen M. Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 
MAYER BROWN (1999), http://appellate.net/articles/certpractice.asp (last visited Nov. 24, 
2014) (arguing that amicus briefs should not mislead courts, but rather add relevant in-
formation and reflect an independent perspective). 
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One way to prevent parties from appearing in amicus curiae 
clothing is to require a certification of independence or financial 
disclosure. Only a minority of states require the kind of disclosure 
of financial ties to the parties that is required in the Supreme 
Court.
237
 Requiring disclosure and/or certification would do much 
to expose this type of abuse, if not curb it altogether.
238
 
Some states use the amicus curiae status as a way to allow a 
Near Intervenor to be heard, although courts do not seem to rec-
ognize that the Near Intervenor amicus is very different from the 
Friend of a Party interest group.
239
 A New Jersey case suggests 
that crime victims, while lacking standing to intervene on appeal 
from defendant‘s conviction, might be able to file an amicus 
brief.
240
 A New York court allowed a citizens group seeking to in-
tervene in a case involving a town‘s authority to ban hydrofrack-
ing to participate as amicus curiae, but not to intervene.
241
 Some 
state rules contemplate that amicus curiae might be a person or a 
group likely to be affected by the outcome, but not so affected that 
 
 237. SUP. CT. R. 37.6 provides: 
Except for briefs presented on behalf of amicus curiae listed in Rule 37.4, a 
brief filed under this Rule shall indicate whether counsel for a party authored 
the brief in whole or in part and whether such counsel or a party made a 
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the 
brief, and shall identify every person other than the amicus curiae, its mem-
bers, or its counsel, who made such a monetary contribution. The disclosure 
shall be made in the first footnote on the first page of text. 
A number of states also require some disclosure of financial support and/or authorship. 
ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt.; CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f)(4); CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 67-7 (2014 
ed.); ID. APP. R. 8; MD. R. 8-511(b); MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 129.01; N.D. R. APP. P. 29(c); TEX. 
R. APP. P. 11; W. VA. R. APP. P. 30(e); see Aspinall, 813 N.E.2d at 480–81 n.8. 
 238. Deterrence was certainly the hope behind the federal disclosure requirement. 
The disclosure requirement, which is modeled on Supreme Court Rule 37.6, 
serves to deter counsel from using an amicus curiae brief to circumvent page 
limits on the parties‘ briefs. See Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (noting the majority‘s suspicion ―that amicus briefs are often used 
as a means of evading the page limitations on a party‘s briefs‖). It also may 
help judges to assess whether the amicus itself considers the issue important 
enough to sustain the cost and effort of filing an amicus brief. 
FED. R. APP. P. 29, Advisory Committee Notes—2010 Amendments; see SUP. CT. R. 37.6. 
 239. See infra notes 240–43. 
 240. State v. Tedesco, 69 A.3d 103, 109 (N.J. 2013). 
 241. ―Here, although members of [the citizens group] submitted affidavits identifying 
effects that hydrofracking may have on their daily lives, these claimed impacts were large-
ly speculative and failed to demonstrate a substantial interest in the outcome of the action 
different from other residents of the Town.‖ Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 
964 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), leave to appeal granted, 2013-604, 2013 WL 
4562930 (N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013). 
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they have standing as a party.
242
 These rules might allow amicus 
curiae status, for example, if the would-be amicus curiae has 
―substantial, legitimate interests that will likely be affected by 
the outcome of the case and which interests will not be adequate-
ly protected by those already party to the case.‖
243
 
But in other states, amicus curiae status is denied precisely be-
cause a party is too close to intervenor status, and has no new in-
formation or perspective to offer.
244
 In these states, the concept of 
amicus curiae as a friend to the court means that near interve-
nors will not probably qualify as amicus.
245
 For example, a Dela-
ware court denied both intervenor and amicus curiae status to a 
member of the class otherwise represented in the class action.
246
 
Stressing that the court did not need such amicus curiae assis-
tance in the particular case because the parties were well-
represented, and the would-be amicus curiae had no new infor-
mation or perspective to offer, the court said, 
[Applicant‘s] interest in these proceedings, as set forth in its motion, 
is not objective, unique, or related to a question of general public im-
portance. Rather, [applicant‘s] interest is specific to its status as a 
class member. To the extent that this case involves any issues of 
general public importance, [applicant] has not indicated why those 
issues will not be adequately addressed by the attorneys for the par-
ties. Consequently, the record does not reflect that this is a case in 
which the Court would benefit by additional assistance from [appli-
cant].
247
 
Thus, sometimes amici curiae and intervenors are seen as be-
ing at the opposite ends of a spectrum of direct involvement in the 
case: amici curiae should be disinterested friends of the court, 
while intervenors must have sufficient interest in the dispute to 
be a party. Yet at other times, amicus curiae and intervenors are 
seen as divided by a thin line: one who falls just short of that line 
may not have sufficient interest to intervene but may file an ami-
 
 242. 41 MASS. PRAC. SERIES, APP. P. § 5:26. This Near Intervenor amicus curiae is also 
implied in Judge Posner‘s suggested factors for amicus, and has been a part of amicus cu-
riae definitions for some time. See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545 
(7th Cir. 2003). 
 243. LA. SUP. CT. R. 7-12; MISS. R. APP. P. 29(a). Yet, a Mississippi court has interpret-
ed this rule narrowly, denying amicus status to a realtor‘s association that failed to ―com-
ply with [this] criteria.‖ Taylor v. Roberts, 475 So. 2d 150, 151–52 (Miss. 1985). 
 244. Accord Giammalvo v. Sunshine Mining Co., 644 A.2d 407, 410 (Del. 1994). 
 245. See id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
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cus curiae brief.
248
 These different conceptions are not acknowl-
edged or analyzed as such—all are subsumed under the idea of 
―friend of the court.‖ 
It may be that courts are not bothered by the inconsistencies 
resulting from having amicus curiae cover such different roles be-
cause courts can simply disregard troublesome or unhelpful amici 
curiae.
249
 A study in 2006 surveyed the chief judge/justice and ap-
pellate court clerk of every state court of last resort as to the use-
fulness of amicus briefs. It found that most respondents are 
―moderately supportive‖ of amicus curiae and that they estimated 
amicus briefs to be useful 25% to 75% of the time.
250
 These judges 
believed amicus briefs were most useful when articulating policy 
considerations or social science evidence.
251
 And regardless of the 
level of amicus curiae participation in their state, these judges 
and clerks were satisfied with that level of participation.
252
 The 
survey results suggest that while judges may occasionally be irri-
tated by what they perceive as unhelpful amicus curiae, on the 
whole they are happy to read (or at least skim) the additional 
briefs. The survey also suggests that while courts might prefer a 
certain type of amicus curiae contribution, they do not wish to 
tightly constrain these friends or put up a bouncer and velvet 
rope at the courthouse door. 
Two articles discussed amicus curiae participation in single 
states, both of which are considered to have high levels of amicus 
briefing. One article surveyed Florida judges on the usefulness of 
amicus briefs. Some of the judges complained that ―too many are 
meaningless vanity efforts,‖ or ―just an echo‖ of the party brief.
253
 
The chief judge at the time had adopted Judge Posner‘s view that 
amicus briefs should be screened carefully for usefulness.
254
 But in 
practice the Florida courts admitted amicus briefs without great 
 
 248. See supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text. 
 249. Krislov referred to the amicus brief‘s ―delusive innocuousness, its seemingly static 
function and terminology, taken together with the offhand manner of its usual use in 
court . . . .‖ Krislov, supra note 4, at 694. 
 250. Corbally, Bross, & Flango, supra note 64, at 185 (―27 percent of the justices re-
garded fewer than a quarter influential, 32 percent considered between a quarter and one 
half influential, and 36 percent considered between one half and three quarters influen-
tial.‖). 
 251. See id. 
 252. See id. at 187. 
 253. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 60, at 277. 
 254. Cf. id. at 298 (noting Florida courts‘ general allowance of amicus briefs notwith-
standing opposition). 
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scrutiny.
255
 Moreover, the article‘s survey of cases showed that 
amicus curiae had often influenced decisions.
256
 Similarly, an arti-
cle about amicus curiae in the New York Court of Appeals con-
cluded that amicus participation had increased in recent decades 
and that these briefs did have some effect on the disposition of 
cases.
257
 But unlike Florida‘s chief judge, the New York Court of 
Appeals sought to increase amicus curiae participation.
258
 
IV.  THE LIMITS OF FRIENDSHIP:  TOWARD A CLEARER 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF AMICUS  
As the foregoing section shows, there is something curious 
about the way amici curiae are so lightly regulated, allowed to 
wander into court at will, and potentially take control of cases at 
the expense of litigants who will actually be bound by the court‘s 
decision. Yet neither courts nor litigants seem particularly con-
cerned about the amicus curiae role, even as it has expanded. 
There is the occasional exasperated judicial complaint about use-
less, duplicative, amicus briefs. Nevertheless, judges, by and 
large, seem to appreciate the option to consider amicus briefs, and 
neither litigants nor lawyers have organized in protest. 
Of course, the fact that few seem alarmed does not mean that 
there is not a problem. The fact that courts and others have not 
clearly distinguished between the different types of amicus curi-
ae—other than to give the state most-favored-amicus status—has 
led to some confusion and muddy reasoning. A recurring com-
plaint about amicus curiae is that they may be merely paid help-
ers of a litigant.
259
 The credibility of all amicus curiae could be 
helped if all courts adopted at least the disclosure requirements 
of the federal courts. Courts worried about abuse by the ―puppets 
of a party‖ could go as far as Arizona and forbid ghost-writing or 
 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. at 299–300. 
 257. Matthew Laroche, Is the New York State Court of Appeals Still “Friendless?” An 
Empirical Study of Amicus Curiae Participation, 72 ALB. L. REV. 701, 715, 725, 753 (2009). 
 258. See id. at 703 (―In December of 1988, the court even added a preamble to its week-
ly list of new filings which encourages the submission of amicus briefs.‖). 
 259. See, e.g., David B. Smallman, Amicus Practice: New Rules for Old Friends, 25 
LITIG. 25, 28–29 (1999) (describing compensated amici as one of the ―perceived abuses in 
amicus practice‖ and noting how Texas has enacted a financial disclosure provision in its 
appellate rules to prevent such abuse). See also supra notes 103–05 and accompanying 
text.  
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funding of amicus briefs.
260
 More importantly, if amicus curiae 
practice continues to grow in courts other than the Supreme 
Court of the United States,
261
 courts and litigants should prepare 
for the challenges this expansion will present. 
The lack of clarity about the different roles of amicus curiae, 
caused in part by the failure to distinguish between the various 
kinds of friends, will make it difficult for courts to deal effectively 
with an upsurge in amicus curiae participation that may be 
headed for the federal and state appellate courts. Rather than 
presiding over an unexamined transformation of appellate court 
decision-making in imitation of the Supreme Court, these courts 
should clarify the role and purpose of amicus curiae, as well as 
the role of an appellate court in resolving disputes. At present, 
there is general complacency about amicus curiae participation; a 
sense that more is probably better and the courts can competently 
separate the useful from the duplicative.
262
 But with some clarity 
about the types and purposes of amicus curiae, courts might be in 
a better position to establish limits that could improve amicus 
participation and the resolution of disputes. 
To clarify the role of amicus curiae, and especially the role of a 
Friend of a Party, courts need to address the myth of disinterest 
that is tied to the term ―friend of the court.‖ The idea that amicus 
curiae should be impartial, despite a general recognition that 
most amici curiae are supporting a party, persists. Second, to un-
derstand what legitimate interests amici curiae may have, courts 
need to clarify their own role: Is a court decision more like a legis-
lative decision so that courts should gather as many opinions, pol-
icy arguments, and factual inputs as possible? Or should they 
limit this kind of input, as democratic as it might be, out of defer-
ence to the parties who will be bound by the decision? Is a court‘s 
primary purpose to ―get the law right,‖ or is it to resolve a dis-
pute? 
A.  The Myth of Disinterest 
Although most modern judges admit that an amicus curiae will 
usually be partisan, the idea that amicus should be ―disinterest-
 
 260. See ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt. to 1998 Amendments. 
 261. There are indications that it will continue to grow. See Yeager, supra note 109. 
 262. See, e.g., Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs 
a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (2011) (noting and critiquing the Court‘s reliance 
on amicus briefs in antitrust cases). See also supra note 19. 
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ed‖ or at least not very partisan, persists. We see this idea in 
Judge Posner‘s writing and elsewhere.
263
 One judge stated that 
[h]istorically, amicus curiae is an impartial individual who suggests 
the interpretation and status of the law, gives information concern-
ing it, and advises the Court in order that justice may be done, ra-
ther than to advocate a point of view so that a cause may be won by 
one party or another.‖
264
 
In fact, not too long ago, a complete lack of interest was seen as 
disqualifying an amicus curiae applicant. Law professors, for ex-
ample, might see their amicus curiae efforts rebuffed, although 
now they are regular amicus curiae authors in the Supreme 
Court.
265
 In 1957, the solicitor general issued a policy on the con-
sent to amicus curiae participation:  
The Department of Justice frowns upon the filing by amici with 
merely an academic interest at one extreme, or those who merely 
wish to engage in propaganda on the other. Consent is given ―where 
the applicant has a concrete, substantial interest in the decision of 
the case, and the proposed brief would assist the Court by presenting 
relevant arguments or materials which would not otherwise be sub-
mitted.‖
266
  
Simply having an opinion, even a learned one, was not enough to 
merit amicus curiae participation.
267
 
Those who, like Judge Posner, nevertheless harken back to a 
disinterest ideal seem to be saying that they want a true friend, 
 
 263. The Ninth Circuit countered this argument in Funbus Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. 
Comm‘n., 801 F.2d 1120, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 1986) (―[W]e have stated that there is no rule 
that amici must be totally disinterested.‖). 
 264. Cmty. Ass‘n for Restoration of Env‘t (CARE) v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 
2d 974, 975 (E.D. Wash. 1999). 
 265. See Franze & Anderson, supra note 170 (noting the frequency with which Su-
preme Court Justices cite law professors‘ amicus briefs). See generally Am. Coll. of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting law 
professors‘ amicus brief for lack of interest in the case). 
 266. Krislov, supra note 4, at 715 (emphasis added). 
 267. See id. This view was echoed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in 1983 when it rejected an amicus brief by law professors: 
The law professors do not purport to represent any individual or organization 
with a legally cognizable interest in the subject matter at issue, and give only 
their concern about the manner in which this court will interpret the law as 
the basis for their brief. Since there is no indication that the parties to the 
law suit and those parties who have been granted leave to file a brief amicus 
curiae will not adequately present all relevant legal arguments, there is no 
persuasive reason to grant the motion. 
 Thornburgh, 699 F.2d at 645. Could it be that the rise of law professor briefs coincides 
with the rise of law professors who have been appellate clerks? In this light, the amicus 
brief is a continuation of the clerkship role. 
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one who will help the Court rather than try to influence it. Yet 
Judge Posner would also allow the Near Intervenor, who has a 
clear private interest in the dispute and who has historically been 
allowed to participate as amicus curiae.
268
 Those who claim to 
want disinterested amicus curiae are really saying they want lim-
its on certain amicus curiae. 
The issue seems less to be interest or lack of interest than the 
nature of that interest. The state and invited friends will certain-
ly be interested, but the courts see those interests as presumably 
legitimate. The Court‘s Lawyer amicus is assigned an interest by 
the court.
269
 The Near Intervenor‘s interests are clear,
270
 and the 
amicus curiae avenue for expressing those interests seems rea-
sonable. Friends of a Party, or Independent Friends, however, 
may have interests that the court finds intrusive or less rele-
vant.
271
 The court may be hostile to some of those interests, or the 
court may resent duplicative efforts on behalf of the parties. 
One interesting example involves the role of amicus curiae in 
so-called death penalty ―volunteer‖ cases, i.e., where a defendant 
sentenced to death refuses to appeal or otherwise challenge the 
sentence.
272
 The Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected an amicus 
brief by a public defender association, reasoning that the court 
was not required to ―grant a request to appear as amicus curiae if 
the parties to a proceeding have taken nonadversarial positions 
on an issue on which the person seeking to be admitted as an 
amicus curiae takes an opposing view.‖
273
 Yet the Supreme Court 
of South Dakota reached a contrary conclusion. The court ap-
pointed an attorney as amicus curiae to review the record and ar-
gue any potential issues when it became clear that the defend-
ant‘s attorney had been instructed not to contest the sentence.
274
 
 
 268. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 269. See Krislov, supra note 4, at 720; see also supra Part II.B; supra notes 93–94. 
 270. See supra Part II.F; see also Justin Gunter, Standards for Third-Party Interve-
nors: Distinguishing Between Public-Law and Private-Law Intervention, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
645, 657 (2013) (discussing Rule 24‘s requirement that proposed intervenors must claim 
an interest in the action). 
 271. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently 
rejected an amicus curiae effort by attorneys representing the district court judge after the 
appellate court reassigned the case to another trial court judge for the appearance of fair-
ness reasons. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 272. State v. Robert, 820 N.W. 2d 136, 140–41 & n.7 (S.D. 2012), 
 273. State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 674 (Conn. 2005). 
 274. Robert, 820 N.W. 2d at 141. 
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The court stated, ―This Court is aware of society‘s interest in the 
constitutional imposition of the death penalty. This interest ex-
ists independent of the State‘s interest in punishing [defendant] 
for his crimes.‖
275
 
On the one hand, the Supreme Court of Connecticut is surely 
correct that one who has no concrete stake in the outcome should 
not be allowed to interfere where the parties are in agreement. 
On the other hand, one historical function of amicus curiae was to 
prevent collusion by calling to the court‘s attention considerations 
that the parties would not collude.
276
 And of course, the death 
penalty is unique—the state has a particular interest in its fair 
administration. The death penalty volunteer cases seem like a 
paradigm example of appropriate amicus curiae participation, 
whether or not the amicus is perceived as having an ―interest‖ in 
the outcome. These are perhaps ideal cases for Invited or Inde-
pendent Friends. 
Viewing the question of the amicus curiae‘s interest in light of 
the different types of amicus curiae shows that ―interest‖ becomes 
a problem for some courts and litigants primarily in the Friend of 
a Party category. The question then becomes not whether all ami-
cus curiae should have an interest, but whether a Friend of a 
Party‘s (or Independent Friend‘s) interest is one that justifies 
amicus curiae participation. The answer to that question depends 
in part on how a court views its own job. 
B.  Amicus Input and the Role of the Courts  
There was a time, we are told, when courts were expected only 
to apply the law, or to find it through an exercise in pure rea-
son.
277
 Courts were not seen as making law.
278
 This caricature of 
 
 275. Id. (citation omitted). 
 276. See Krislov, supra note 4, at 695 (discussing the historical role of amicus curiae at 
common law as a method for calling attention to manifest error or existing statutes); see 
also Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(pointing out that the court is helped by amici curiae that bring to the court‘s attention 
matters that the parties have omitted). 
 277. Helen A. Anderson, Legal Doubletalk and the Concern with Positional Conflicts: A 
“Foolish Consistency”? 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 14 (2006). 
 278. Id. (―An early Nineteenth Century belief in natural law gave way to a classical 
view of law as the objective application of known principles.
 
Thus, judges were viewed as 
constrained by rules, rules that could be determined correctly through reason.‖) (citing 
Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 19–26 (David Kairys ed., 1982)). 
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the judicial role may never have completely taken hold, yet nor 
has it ever been entirely expunged. It survives in the popular 
mind even today, as we see in the confirmation hearings for Su-
preme Court Justices.
279
 Few educated people today would argue 
that judges do not make law. It may be that the rise in amicus 
curiae involvement coincides with that recognition that courts 
engage in policymaking just as legislatures do.
280
 
But to acknowledge that courts make the law is not to say that 
they should operate just as legislatures do, with the explicit in-
volvement of interest groups. Courts still deal with the law one 
dispute at a time, with litigants who are bound by the decision, 
who shape the course of litigation by their tactical and strategic 
decisions, and who bear the costs of litigation. It is one thing to 
say that a court—especially a high court—should consider the 
impact of its decision in future cases. It is quite another to allow 
the litigants‘ voices to be almost drowned out by those of amici 
curiae. 
Some might argue that certain kinds of cases need significant 
amicus curiae input. They might point to ―public law [or interest] 
litigation‖
281
 such as school desegregation cases and claim that 
these are more like a legislative exercise, with many stakeholders 
whose voices need to be heard.
282
 Even in these situations, howev-
er, those actually bound by the decision are represented in court 
and can receive tactical and financial support from allies. More-
over, it is hard to draw a clear line between the public and private 
dispute. A private dispute might be brought as a test case by an 
 
 279. At Chief Justice John Roberts‘ confirmation hearing, the judge compared himself 
to an umpire, calling balls and strikes. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John 
G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 59 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (―Judges are like 
umpires. Umpires don‘t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a 
judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules but it is a limited role. No-
body ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.‖). During Justice Sonia Sotomayor‘s nom-
ination hearing, she pledged to simply apply the law, and not be moved by empathy. See 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 111th Cong. 59 (2009). 
 280. In fact, it is that recognition that prompted a call for New Zealand to allow amicus 
curiae participation. See Clark, supra note 7, at 71–73. 
 281. See generally Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 282 (1989) (introducing ―public interest litigation‖ and 
explaining its design in vindicating ―the ideological, political, or moral interests‖ of the 
public and attempting to ensure that public institutions behave lawfully). 
 282. Id. at 284, 331. 
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advocacy group in order to create favorable law.
283
 Or, a private 
case such as a custody dispute can take on public importance if it 
is seen as creating law for new domestic situations such as same-
sex parent couples.
284
 The parties to the dispute, whose motives 
may be primarily private and personal, can find themselves the 
center of amicus curiae attention. 
Some courts actively seek amicus curiae, especially when pre-
sented with what they perceive to be a novel question.
285
 Judges 
may like the assistance of amici curiae because it helps them feel 
more assured about their decision, that they are not missing 
something. It may also feed a sense of self-importance to know 
that other organizations are concerned with the decision. To the 
extent that concern inspires the court to do a careful job, that at-
tention is not a bad thing. But can courts get carried away with 
the importance of their policymaking roles? Intermediate appel-
late courts, especially, should be concerned with error correc-
tion.
286
 
A liberal amicus curiae approach is sometimes defended as 
necessary for democratic input into the courts.
287
 But that argu-
ment seems to prove too much. If it is the democratic input we 
value in amicus curiae, why require briefs at all? Why not allow 
petitions and letters to be entered into the appellate record? Most 
courts would reject that idea, sensing that such a policy would 
undermine respect for the court‘s legal reasoning function.
288
 Re-
quiring a brief with legal argument performs some gatekeeping 
and emphasizes the importance of the law in the court‘s decisions. 
And yet, imposing no limit on the number and content of amicus 
curiae briefs can perhaps also undermine respect for the court‘s 
 
 283. See id. at 276 n.33. 
 284. See, e.g., In re Custody of A.F.J., 314 P.3d 373 (Wash. 2013) (three organizations 
filed amicus briefs in a dispute involving the custody of a child parented by a same-sex 
couple). 
 285. It is easy to find examples of briefing invitations to amicus curiae by searching the 
case law databases for ―amicus‖ in the same sentence as ―invitation‖ or ―invited‖. See, e.g., 
Perez v. State, 313 P.3d 862, 866, n.1 (Nev. 2013); Baily v. Schaaf, 812 N.W. 2d 770 (Mich. 
2012); State v. White, 362 S.W. 3d 559, 565 (Tenn. 2012). 
 286. See Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-Century 
Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 459,460 (2009) (arguing that federal courts of appeals are 
too enamored by their roles as law makers, and give error-correction short shrift, to the 
detriment of criminal justice). 
 287. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 196–97; Garcia, supra note 2, at 346. 
 288. See Krislov, supra note 4, at 710–11 (discussing judicial hostility to letters and 
telegrams received from the public in the 1940s and 1950s). 
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role or at least confuse the public about what courts actually do. 
If anyone can file a ―me-too‖ brief, it gives the impression that 
anyone‘s opinion should matter to the court. 
Such an impression might be particularly troublesome with re-
spect to elected judges in state courts. Most of the time, judicial 
races are sleepy affairs and often judges run unopposed.
289
 But in 
recent decades, contested elections have become more common.
290
 
More money has become involved in judicial elections, with in-
creased fundraising anxiety for judicial candidates.
291
 State judges 
endeavor to balance their democratic obligations to the electorate 
with their judicial role as neutral arbiters of the law.
292
 Increased 
political pressure in particular cases in the form of amicus briefs 
could upset that balance if there are no restraints whatsoever.
  
Of course, one might also argue that elected judges in particu-
lar should be sensitive to constituents‘ views, and therefore 
greater amicus curiae participation should be allowed. And per-
haps it is better to have the political pressure out in the open in 
the form of amicus briefs, rather than through back channels or 
television campaigns. Restricting amicus briefs—particularly 
Friend of a Party briefs—is a tricky matter in elected courts. But 
these courts would be warranted in putting some limits, especial-
ly on duplicative or ―puppet of a party‖ briefs, in order to empha-
size the difference between judicial decision-making and legisla-
tive negotiation. 
 
 289. See Rachel P. Caufield, The Changing Tone of Judicial Election Campaigns as a 
Result of White, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL 
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 34 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). 
 290. See id. at 36–37. 
 291. For an example of the importance of money in state judicial elections, see Caper-
ton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 873, 884, 886–87 (2009) (holding that the 
state court judge should have recused himself from the case when the CEO of a party gave 
$3 million to his re-election campaign). Money, and out-of-state funding, are playing a 
growing role in state judicial elections. Erik Eckholm, Outside Spending Enters Arena of 
Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2014, at A12. 
 292. See Sorenson, supra note 8, at 1247–48 (discussing these pressures specifically in 
Texas); ABA STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC FINANCING OF 
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 4, 9 (2002) (reaffirming that ―the states have long struggled to recon-
cile their commitment to electoral accountability with the need to preserve judicial inde-
pendence[,]‖ and recommending the financing of state judicial elections with public funds 
in order to reach the appropriate balance between a judge‘s commitment to electoral ac-
countability and their role as a neutral arbiter). 
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One can, therefore, make a principled argument that amicus 
curiae should be limited, particularly in the Friends of a Party 
and Independent Friends categories. A court of law is not the 
court of public opinion. The parties should retain the right to 
shape the litigation. 
C.  Reasonable Restrictions on Friend of a Party Amicus  
Should courts wish to exercise their gatekeeping powers, there 
are some simple steps they could take. This section focuses on 
limits to Friend of a Party briefs, since these are the most numer-
ous and likely to pose the greatest challenge. There are certainly 
arguments for restricting other types of amicus briefs. The 
Court‘s Lawyer type of amicus curiae, appointed to argue a posi-
tion suggested by neither party, threatens to wrest the case from 
the litigants even more than a Friend of a Party could.
293
 The 
state, allowed to file a brief without consent or permission, now 
has many actors participating as amicus curiae—agencies, chief 
executives, legislators—who perhaps should not all be allowed to 
speak for the state.
294
 But the greatest growth in amicus curiae 
participation is in the Friend of a Party category. 
In addition to requiring amicus curiae to disclose financial 
support and/or ghostwriting by a party, as many courts already 
do,
295
 courts concerned about amici curiae participation could re-
turn to the common law rationale for amicus curiae. A complete 
absence of screening threatens to lead to absurd results, such as 
experts who testify at trial and then attempt to file an amicus 
brief on appeal,
296
 or a trial judge appearing as amicus curiae to 
defend her reputation in the appellate court.
297
 To a large extent, 
a return to the common law justifications for amicus could effec-
tively restrict amicus participation to those with a special interest 
or expertise. These criteria have been alluded to in the Supreme 
 
 293. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 914, 925, 942–45. 
 294. See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1266, 1274. 
 295. FED. R. APP. P. 29; see supra notes 223–24 (financial disclosure) and 232–36 
(ghostwriting disclosure). 
 296. See Witty v. Comm‘n & Town of Harland, 784 A.2d 1011, 1018 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2001) (upholding trial court refusal to allow attorneys to testify as expert witnesses and 
also file an amicus brief). 
 297. See Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 166, 168–69 ((2d Cir. 2013) (denying ami-
cus status to lawyers for a district court judge whose case had been reassigned). 
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Court‘s Northern Securities decision,
298
 and in Judge Posner‘s de-
cisions.
299
 Some state court decisions and court rules also articu-
late these common law criteria. For example, the Court of Ap-
peals of Tennessee explained: 
As a general matter, appointing an amicus is reserved for rare and 
unusual cases that involve questions of general or public interest. An 
amicus can assist the court by (1) providing adversarial presenta-
tions when neither side is represented, (2) providing an adversarial 
presentation when only one point of view is represented, (3) supple-
menting the efforts of counsel even when both sides are represented, 
and (4) drawing the court‘s attention to broader legal or policy impli-
cations that might otherwise escape the court‘s consideration.
300
 
Similarly, the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure require 
motions to file an amicus brief to state that 
(1) amicus has an interest in some other case involving a similar 
question; or (2) counsel for a party is inadequate or the brief insuffi-
cient; or (3) there are matters of fact or law that may otherwise es-
cape the court‘s attention; or (4) the amicus has substantial legiti-
mate interests that will likely be affected by the outcome of the case 
and which interests will not be adequately protected by those al-
ready parties to the case.
301
 
These rules identify the Near Intervenor as a legitimate ami-
cus curiae applicant and also permit amici curiae who truly have 
something helpful to contribute, especially where the party repre-
sentation is inadequate or where amicus stands to be indirectly 
affected by the judgment. These rules do not insist on impartiali-
ty, nor do they suggest that a desire to weigh in is enough. Courts 
concerned about an overload of amicus curiae could return to the-
se criteria as a way to evaluate amicus curiae petitions. They 
should not insist on impartiality or true friendship, concepts 
which have distracted courts from the real roles of amicus curiae. 
Not all courts have the resources or visibility of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Not all litigants in lower courts will 
enjoy the expert volunteer assistance that litigants before the Su-
preme Court can obtain to deal with a multitude of amicus briefs. 
 
 298. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555, 555–56 (1903). 
 299. See, e.g., Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th 
Cir. 1997). 
 300. State ex rel. Comm‘r of Transp. v. Med. Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 
734, 758 (Tenn. App. 2001). 
 301. MISS. R. APP. P. 29(a); see also LA. SUP. CT. R. 7-12 (containing similar language). 
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Some litigants may be unduly burdened by the involvement of 
amicus curiae in their case. If amicus curiae begin to file in feder-
al or state appellate courts at the rate they now do in the Su-
preme Court, these courts should consider limiting amicus curiae 
out of consideration for litigants and the courts, as well as respect 
for the judicial process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Friend of the Court has risen in prominence, and yet has 
largely escaped scrutiny. The category of amicus curiae embraces 
quite different types of actors. Courts, and the court rules that 
govern amicus curiae participation, do not often distinguish be-
tween the Invited Friend, the Friend of the Party, or the Near In-
tervenor. All are ―friends,‖ and yet the term covers a range of 
roles and types of input. 
As the courts‘ recurring references to the meaning of ―friend of 
the court‖ demonstrate, the very term and its friendly implica-
tions have helped mask these distinctions. Courts are remarkably 
open to amicus curiae participation, despite the occasional ex-
pression of misgivings. The friendly connotations of the term, and 
the Supreme Court‘s open-door policy, have established a norm of 
hospitality for amicus curiae, even as rules of joinder, interven-
tion, party status, and standing have grown more constraining on 
others who wish to participate in appellate cases. 
Although the state appellate courts do not seem to be all that 
restrictive of amicus curiae, they do wrestle with some of the con-
tradictions of a category of friends that includes very interested 
Near Intervenors, Friends of a Party, the Court‘s Lawyer, and 
advocacy groups not tied to a party.
302
 If amicus curiae participa-
tion continues to grow, especially in certain states, these jurisdic-
tions may want to take a closer look at the guest list. The open-
door policy that works for the Supreme Court of the United States 
may not be advisable for courts with fewer resources and espe-
cially courts subject to direct democratic pressure. 
Yet on the whole, judges—even those with the greatest number 
of amicus filings—do not seem overly concerned about amici curi-
ae abuse of their positions. This indifference may result in part 
 
 302. See supra Part III.B.3.  
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from the very flexibility of the amicus curiae category. Not only is 
the term flexible enough to cover a range of friends, but the 
courts have great flexibility in dealing with the briefs.
303
 Judges 
are free to use, rely on, quote, discard, or ignore the presentations 
of amicus curiae. Because amici curiae have no right to have their 
arguments addressed, they can remain a pleasant-sounding, 
loosely defined category—as loosely defined as the term ―friend‖ 
in everyday life. 
But although judges may believe that they can sort through an 
increase in amicus curiae filings, their sense of control may be il-
lusory. Studies have shown that amicus briefs are influential in 
court decisions.
304
 Courts should take a closer look at the different 
roles of amici curiae and consider whether it is time to put some 
restrictions on their friendship. 
 
 303. See supra Part III.  
 304. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 745–48 (providing an empirical 
study of the impact of amicus briefs on the Supreme Court of the United States); see also 
Sungaila, supra note 110, at 33–34 (citing various studies on the subject in both the Su-
preme Court and in state supreme courts). 
